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ABSTRACT 
 
Stenberg, Joseph Lee (M.A., Department of Philosophy) 
Being and Goodness: A Medieval Metaethical Thesis 
Thesis directed by Professor Robert Pasnau. 
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas, among others, adopted the following metaethical thesis: 
‘being’ and ‘good’ are the same in reference and differ only in conceptual content.  In 
the first chapter of this work, I exposit and defend this thesis.  In the second 
chapter, I apply the thesis to the case of substances and argue that the thesis 
provides a compelling account of what it is to be a good x, where x is a substance.  In 
the third and final chapter, I consider how the thesis, if true, might structure 
normative ethical debates. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Being and Goodness: A Medieval Metaethical Thesis 
Introduction 
 This is a twofold introduction.  It is first of all an introduction to my project 
as a whole – a project that is comprised of three chapters.  Second, it is an 
introduction to the first of those three chapters.  I will begin by laying out the 
project as a whole. 
 The foundation of the project is a metaethical thesis about the concepts being 
and good thing, which was embraced in the medieval period by, among others, St. 
Thomas Aquinas.1  This thesis states, in Aquinas’s words, that “‘bonum’ et ‘ens’ sunt 
idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum.”2  Which may be 
translated, “‘good’ and ‘being’ are the same in reference, and differ only in 
conceptual content.”3  In brief, this thesis, which I will call the Coextensionality 
Thesis, suggests that that in virtue of which a given thing is a good thing is the very 
same set of essential and non-essential attributes that make a given thing a being; 
‘good’ and ‘being’ are the same in reference.  But ‘good’ and ‘being’ differ in 
conceptual content.  That is, the other concepts most closely associated with ‘good’ 
and ‘being’ differ.  Aquinas argues that ‘good’ is primarily associated with 
desirability, in a very broad sense, and ‘being’ is primarily associated with actuality.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  early	  statement	  of	  the	  view	  is	  found	  in	  St.	  Augustine’s	  De	  Doctrina	  Christiana,	  which	  Aquinas	  cites	  in	  the	  sed	  contra	  of	  ST	  1a	  Q.5,	  a.1c:	  “inasmuch	  as	  we	  exist	  we	  are	  good.”	  	  Augustine,	  R.P.H.	  Green	  (tr.),	  De	  Doctrina	  Christiana,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  2	  Thomas	  Aquinas.	  Summa	  Theologiae,	  1a	  Q.5,	  a.1c.	  (Summa	  Theologiae	  will	  be	  abbreviated	  ST	  henceforth.).	  3	  This	  translation	  is	  my	  own.	  	  An	  alternative	  translation	  offered	  by	  Eleonore	  Stump	  and	  Norman	  Kretzmann	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “‘being’	  and	  ‘goodness’	  are	  the	  same	  in	  reference,	  differing	  only	  in	  sense.”	  Eleonore	  Stump	  and	  Norman	  Kretzmann,	  “Being	  and	  Goodness,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  of	  
the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991).	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Thus, Aquinas argues that ‘good’ and ‘being’ are the same in reference and differ 
only in conceptual content.  
 Even with this brief description of the Thesis, it remains opaque.  And so one 
would be justified in asking, “In what sense this is a specifically metaethical thesis?”  
It is metaethical, if, as is commonly supposed, metaethics includes “questions about 
the nature of evaluative statements and judgments.”4  But it may not initially be 
obvious that the Coextensionality Thesis has anything to do with the nature of 
evaluative judgments.  I assure you that in time it will be clear that this Thesis, 
when understood as Aquinas understood it, answers questions about the nature of 
evaluative judgments, insofar as evaluative judgments concern good substances and 
bad substances (‘substance’ understood here in the Aristotelian sense); the Thesis, 
in itself, suggests nothing about the nature of rightness and wrongness and so these 
concepts will not be addressed in this project.5 Chapter 2 is almost exclusively 
devoted to the primary sort of evaluative judgment that can be grounded in the 
thesis.  Namely, judgments of the form, “This x is a good x,” where x is a substance. 
 One might take the Coextensionality Thesis to be metaethical in another 
sense as well.  One might think that one function of metaethics is, in some sense, to 
structure the debate in normative ethics.  In practice, this would involve noting how 
a particular metaethical view would impose limits on normative ethical views.6  So, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Michael	  Huemer,	  Ethical	  Intuitionism,	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2005),	  ix.	  5	  Chapter	  3	  mentions	  ‘right	  action’	  at	  various	  points,	  but	  nothing	  like	  an	  account	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  right	  action	  is	  entailed	  by	  the	  Coextensionality	  Thesis.	  6	  Of	  course,	  metaethics	  and	  normative	  ethics	  exist	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  dynamic	  relationship	  in	  which	  one’s	  views	  about	  either	  field	  may	  shape	  one’s	  views	  in	  the	  other.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  seems	  that	  more	  often	  than	  not	  one’s	  normative	  views	  will	  shape	  one’s	  metaethical	  views,	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa.	  	  But,	  at	  very	  least	  in	  principle,	  a	  shift	  in	  one’s	  metaethical	  views	  may	  force	  a	  shift	  in	  one’s	  normative	  ethical	  views.	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for example, if the metaethical thesis that ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ refer 
to sui generis moral properties were true, then any naturalistic conception of 
normative ethics would be removed from serious consideration.  In Chapter 3, I 
suggest that the Coextensionality Thesis may serve this sort of general metaethical 
function. In doing so, I argue that the thesis will clearly exclude some normative 
ethical candidates from serious consideration, including rule-consequentialism and 
certain deontological theories. 
 Now that it is clear why I take the Coextensionality Thesis to be metaethical 
in character, it is natural to wonder what general sort of metaethical approach the 
Thesis entails.  Does the thesis entail a form of realism or anti-realism?  If it entails 
a form of realism, is it a form of naturalism or non-naturalism?  And so forth.   
 In brief, insofar as metaethics is concerned with goodness and badness, the 
Coextensionality Thesis entails realism.  It entails naturalism.  And it entails a 
form of naturalism that has been called “synthetic reductionism,” which is a form of 
naturalism on which “the meaning of ‘good’ cannot be given using non-evaluative 
expressions, [but] one can explain what goodness is using non-evaluative 
expressions.”7  The reason for this may be clear from the brief description of the 
Thesis that I gave above.  What it is to be a good thing has to do with having a set of 
essential and non-essential (non-evaluative) attributes.  However, ‘good’ is 
connected conceptually to desirability.  So on Aquinas’s view, a thing’s being 
desirable does not make it a good thing, but rather accompanies a thing’s being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Huemer,	  xii.	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good.8  Thus, the concept most closely associated with being good, namely 
desirability, does not tell us what it is for a thing to be good. And what it is to be a 
good thing can be explained using non-evaluative terms: being a good thing of a 
particular kind has to do with being a perfect member of a kind, where ‘perfection’ 
is connected to having the attributes that characteristically allow a thing of a kind 
to attain its end(s).  So what it is to be a good thing, according to the 
Coextensionality Thesis, at least as Aquinas understood it, is for a thing to have the 
attributes that characteristically allow things of its kind to attain their end(s).  
 Perhaps because of its place in the metaethical taxonomy, the 
Coextensionality Thesis will be compelling.  For, while preserving moral realism, it 
makes the moral domain less spooky and obscure than it would be if one accepted 
non-naturalism.  This is so because the Thesis implies that the goodness of human 
persons is analogous to the goodness of things like oak trees.  Also, when compared 
to forms of non-naturalism, comparative advantages attend this sort of view at least 
in regards to moral knowledge, parsimony, and moral motivation.  Perhaps for 
reasons such as these, metaethical views of this general form have been defended in 
the contemporary literature by, among others, Philippa Foot and Michael 
Thompson. I mention the Thesis’s place in the metaethical taxonomy, some of its 
basic implications, and contemporary advocates of similar views only with the 
intent to convince that the thesis is sufficiently intelligible, sufficiently well 
motivated, and sufficiently plausible to warrant further consideration.  For on its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  ST	  1a	  Q.5,	  a.1	  ad1.	  	  “bonum	  dicit	  rationem	  perfecti,	  quod	  est	  appetibile.”	  Or,	  “‘good	  thing’	  signifies	  ‘perfect	  thing,’	  which	  is	  desirable.”	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face the Coextensionality Thesis is opaque, if not mysterious, and may be off-
putting for that reason. 
 In sum, the three-chapter project develops, defends, and applies a form of 
synthetic reductionism regarding the concept good, which has the medieval 
metaethical thesis that ‘good’ and ‘being’ have the same referents and differ only in 
conceptual content at its foundation.  The basic development and defense of the 
Coextensionality Thesis takes place in Chapter 1; Chapter 2 focuses upon the 
application of the Thesis to statements of the form “This x is a good x,” where x is a 
substance; and Chapter 3 suggests how the Thesis might be utilized in structuring 
contemporary normative ethical debates. 
 And so, moving forward, the present chapter has two main goals: (1) to make 
the Coextensionality Thesis comprehensible and (2) to make the Thesis plausible.  
The first two sections are relevant to the first of these goals.  The first section will 
begin to lay the groundwork for understanding the Thesis by describing the 
reference of the concepts being and good thing in the context of the Thesis.  The 
second section will address Aquinas’s central argument in support of the 
Coextensionality Thesis and in so doing shed light on what the Thesis means.  The 
second section will also mark the beginning of my attempt to make the Thesis 
plausible.  For by considering Aquinas’s argument in some detail, I hope to make 
the Thesis seem at least prima facie plausible.  In section three, in an effort to make 
the view more readily comprehensible and plausible, I will explain in greater detail 
why I think the Thesis ought to be seen as a form of synthetic reductionism.  In 
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section four, I will answer the most obvious sorts of objections to the view that I am 
defending.  Finally, in the fifth section I will briefly draw attention to one feature of 
the view that will be particularly important going forward, namely, the implication 
that a substance, x, is good to the extent to which x is a perfect member of x’s kind. 
 Before beginning the formal discussion of the Thesis, it is important to clarify 
whether I am talking about words or concepts when addressing ‘being’ and ‘good’ in 
the context of the Thesis.  In addressing Thomas Aquinas’s work, there is generally 
little need to distinguish between the two because he takes words to function quite 
straightforwardly as signs for concepts.9  However, in the context of the 
Coextensionality Thesis, more must be said.  For Aquinas recognizes that the term 
‘bonum’ is not used univocally.10  And it seems that this thesis involves the primary 
or central case of goodness around which the other uses of the term are built, 
namely the goodness of substances.  For this reason, it seems more appropriate to 
treat ‘bonum’ as a concept, rather than a term because I take it that the term 
‘bonum’ covers cases that are not covered by the Thesis.  So in the present context, 
again, it seems appropriate to say that ‘bonum’ is a rather refined concept, which 
deals with the goodness of substances, signified by the more general term, ‘bonum,’ 
which deals with many others sorts of goodness all of which are presumably 
connected to the goodness of substances in some way.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Aquinas	  accepts	  Aristotle’s	  views	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  signs	  and	  concepts	  as	  expressed	  in	  De	  
interpretatione.	  	  The	  key	  text	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  Aristotle’s	  De	  interpretatione	  16a3-­‐4,	  which	  states,	  “Spoken	  words	  are	  signs	  of	  concepts.”	  See	  in,	  e.g.,	  Richard	  McKeon,	  The	  Basic	  Works	  of	  Aristotle,	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1941).	  For	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  of	  Aquinas’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  see,	  for	  instance,	  E.	  Jennifer	  Ashworth,	  “Aquinas	  on	  Significant	  Utterance:	  Interjection,	  Blasphemy,	  Prayer,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  and	  Eleonore	  Stump,	  Aquinas’s	  Moral	  Theory:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  Norman	  Kretzmann,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  207-­‐234.	  10	  Thomas	  Aquinas.	  De	  Veritate	  (DV),	  XXI.4.	  “bonum	  non	  univoce	  dicitur	  de	  bonis.”	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§1: What is the reference of being and good?  
 In order to make plausible the Thesis that the concepts good thing and being 
are the same in reference and differ only in content, we must first have some 
understanding of the reference of the concepts being and good thing.  
 The Latin term translated as, ‘being,’ is ‘ens.’  Each and every existent thing 
of any kind is counted as an ens.  However, the primary sort of ens is a substance, 
such as a horse, a rock, or a man, with its essential attributes.11 The non-essential 
concrete attributes of substances, such as this particular blackness on this horse or 
this disposition in this man, are considered ens, but only in a certain respect.12 Any 
sort of non-concretized property or non-existent thing is not properly considered an 
ens.  Only existent things are ens.  In Aquinas’s general view, ‘things’ is taken in a 
very broad sense.  Indeed, Aquinas accepts the idea that ‘ens’ may be predicated of 
all members of each of Aristotle’s ten categories.  This is so because Aquinas accepts 
the doctrine of the transcendentals, according to which ens is one of the concepts 
that transcends the boundaries of the ten categories and so can rightly be 
predicated of all real things.13  However, Aquinas recognizes that ‘ens,’ like ‘bonum,’ 
is not predicated univocally.  Again, the primary sort of being is a substance, and 
the secondary sorts of beings are non-essential concrete attributes of substances. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  ST	  1a	  Q5	  ad1:	  “unde	  per	  suum	  esse	  substantiale	  dicitur	  unumquodque	  ens	  simpliciter.”	  12	  ST	  1a	  Q5	  ad1:	  “viewed	  in	  its	  complete	  actuality,	  a	  thing	  is	  said	  to	  be	  relatively.”	  13	  See	  Aristotle’s	  Categories	  in,	  e.g.,	  Richard	  McKeon,	  The	  Basic	  Works	  of	  Aristotle,	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1941).	  Aristotle	  suggested	  that	  these	  ten	  categories	  are	  an	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  all	  expressions	  that	  are	  in	  no	  way	  composite.	  	  Thus,	  all	  determinate	  forms	  of	  being	  were	  thought	  to	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  these	  ten	  categories.	  	  For	  more	  information	  on	  Aquinas’s	  views	  concerning	  the	  transcendentals	  in	  general,	  see	  Jan	  Aertsen,	  
Medieval	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Transcendentals:	  the	  case	  of	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  (Boston:	  Brill	  Academic	  Publishers,	  1996).	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 Bonum too is considered a transcendental.14 The reason for this may be clear 
enough from the broad range of cases in which the English concept, good, is 
deployed.  Good, like bonum, can be predicated of all sorts of disparate things, 
including cars, sleepovers, the situation in Britain, and dogs.  It is important to 
mention again that Aquinas does not believe that the term, ‘bonum,’ is a univocal 
term.15  That is, although there are connections between the ways in which we 
apply the term, ‘bonum,’ there is no single account concerning what makes things of 
disparate Aristotelian categories good.16  On the other hand, the concept bonum, or 
good thing, in the context of the thesis does seem to have only one sort of thing as 
its primary referent.  
 Like ens, bonum has both particular substances, and the concrete non-
essential attributes of substances as its referents.  But unlike ens, a thing is bonum 
primarily because of non-essential attributes and bonum in a certain respect in 
virtue of having the essential attributes that it has just by existing as a member of 
its kind.17 So, for example, an oak tree is good in a certain respect just because it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  For	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  concerning	  Aquinas’s	  views	  on	  Good	  and	  the	  Transcendentals	  see	  Jan	  Aertsen,	  “Good	  as	  Transcendental	  and	  the	  Transcendence	  of	  the	  Good,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  
Concept	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  56-­‐73.	  	  And	  Scott	  MacDonald,	  “The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Goodness	  and	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  the	  Transcendentals,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  31-­‐55.	  	  15	  DV	  XXI.4.	  16	  Jan	  Aertsen,	  “Good	  as	  Transcendental	  and	  the	  Transcendence	  of	  the	  Good,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  
and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  69.	  17	  ST	  1a	  Q5	  ad1.	  “Viewed	  in	  its	  primal	  (i.e.	  substantial)	  being	  a	  thing	  is	  said	  to	  be	  simply,	  and	  to	  be	  good	  relatively	  (i.e.	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  has	  being)	  but	  viewed	  in	  its	  complete	  actuality,	  a	  thing	  is	  said	  to	  be	  relatively,	  and	  to	  be	  good	  simply.	  	  Hence	  the	  saying	  of	  Boethius	  (De	  Hebdomadibus),	  ‘I	  perceive	  that	  in	  nature	  the	  fact	  that	  things	  are	  good	  is	  one	  thing;	  that	  they	  are	  is	  another,’	  is	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  a	  thing’s	  goodness	  simply,	  and	  having	  being	  simply.”	  	  	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Aquinas’s	  treatment	  of	  Boethius’s	  De	  hebdomadibus,	  see	  Ralph	  McInerny,	  “Saint	  Thomas	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exists as a member of its kind.  But a particular oak tree is good absolutely 
speaking because it has the appropriate set of non-essential attributes of an oak 
tree.   
 Because the reference of bonum is fixed by the substantial and concrete non-
essential attributes of a substance, I will often translate the term, ‘bonum,’ as the 
substantive, ‘good thing,’ rather than simply as the adjective, ‘good.’18  
 Even if we are right to understand bonum in the context of the Thesis in this 
way, it seems that there are generally two ways in which we deploy the English 
concept, good, in relation to substances.  First, we say that a substance is ‘a good 
thing, x,’ when it performs its function well.  For example, I say that I have a ‘good 
car’ when it reliably takes me from Denver to Grand Junction because the function 
of a car is to reliably transport persons and things.  Second, we say that human 
beings, who – of course – are substances, are ‘good people’ when they have certain 
moral attributes, such as being compassionate and being honest.  So, according to 
the thesis, is a substance good because it performs its function well or because of its 
moral character?  
 The answer is both, for those who accept this Thesis consider the distinction 
between these two sorts of goodness illusory.  In other words, one implication of the 
Coextensionality Thesis, which will become clearer in time, is that moral goodness 
is subsumed under a more general account of what it is to be good that is applicable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  on	  De	  hebdomadibus”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  
and	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  74-­‐97.	  18	  The	  neuter	  singular	  term,	  ‘bonum,’	  can	  rightly	  be	  translated	  as	  a	  substantive	  adjective	  and	  so	  rendered	  ‘good	  thing’	  in	  English.	  	  My	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so	  should	  be	  even	  clearer	  when	  considering	  Aquinas’s	  argument	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  On	  the	  substantive	  use	  of	  adjectives	  in	  Latin,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Andrew	  Keller	  and	  Stephanie	  Russell,	  Learn	  to	  Read	  Latin,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  52.	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to all concrete substances.  That more general account is a something like the 
function-based account offered above.  Because we tend to think of moral goodness 
as a distinct category of goodness, this approach will undoubtedly seem altogether 
unacceptable to some. For now, I will only acknowledge that, indeed, the account 
that I am proposing entails that the moral goodness of rational agents is just a 
special kind of goodness, which is subsumed under a more general account that 
applies to all substances. Over the course of the first two chapters, I hope to show 
that such a view is plausible and that it in fact has certain advantages vis-à-vis 
non-naturalistic approaches, such as advantages related to parsimony and moral 
knowledge. 
 But certainly there are other sorts of goodness besides the goodness related to 
function and the goodness related to morality.  Indeed it seems that there are at 
least two more distinct sorts of goodness.  First, states of affairs are said to be good 
or bad.  For example, we might say that the situation in Britain is good and the 
situation in Haiti is bad.  And second, we use ‘good’ with reference to judgments 
concerning welfare.  For example, we might say that Patsi Ramsey’s life was not 
good because of certain facts about her life.   Does the Thesis include these cases?19   
 If it speaks to them at all, it speaks to them only indirectly.  Given the notion 
that the concept bonum has only substances counted among its primary referents, it 
seems natural to judge the goodness of states of affairs in large part according to 
the aggregate goodness of substances included therein.  So, if the situation were 
better in Britain than in Haiti, this would be true because of facts related to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  fourfold	  distinction	  regarding	  goodness	  is	  Chris	  Heathwood’s,	  given	  in	  conversation.	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substances in these two places.  Similarly, the Thesis does not entail any particular 
view concerning welfare, but it lends itself quite naturally to a view on which the 
welfare of a substance is related to a substance achieving its objective ends.  That 
is, a thing would be thought to fare well to the extent to which it attained its 
objective ends. Of course, at this point in the chapter, how precisely this view lends 
itself to this position remains unclear.  I mention it only to make plain that there 
will be something to say about the case of welfare in light of the Thesis, even though 
it seems that nothing concerning welfare is entailed by the Thesis. 
 In this section, I have attempted to clarify the reference of the concepts ens 
and bonum as deployed in the context of the metaethical thesis that ens and bonum 
have the same referents and differ only in content.  It should now be clear that, in 
the context of the thesis, ens and bonum are thought to share the same primary 
referent, namely, particular substances with their essential and non-essential 
concrete attributes.  However, it should also be clear that a thing is an ens primarily 
in virtue of its essential attributes and bonum primarily in virtue of non-essential 
concrete attributes. 
§2: Aquinas’s argument in support of the metaethical thesis 
 Now that the referent(s) of the concepts involved in the thesis is better 
understood, we are in a position to consider what the Coextensionality Thesis itself 
is claiming. The Thesis states that the concepts being (ens) and good thing (bonum) 
have the same referent and differ only in content.  We might clarify what this 
means by considering the case of the morning star. The concepts morning star and 
	   12	  
evening star have the same referent, namely, the planet Venus, but the concepts 
morning star and evening star differ in content (the former’s content is something 
like, “heavenly body bright in the east before sunrise,” and the latter’s, “heavenly 
body bright in the west after sunset”). In the case of being and good thing, in any 
given case being and good thing are thought to share their referents – namely, the 
set of all the substantial attributes and concrete non-essential attributes of a 
substance. So they are the same in reference. But we have little discussed how 
being and good thing differ in content. 
 Before we do so, it is appropriate to quote Aquinas’s argument for the 
conclusion that being and good thing have the same referent and differ only in 
content.  For the contents of the concepts being and good are the foundation upon 
which Aquinas’s argument rests: 
 The conceptual content of good thing consists in this: that it is 
something desirable.  Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. I): 
“The good is what all desire.”  Now it is clear that each thing is 
desirable insofar as it is perfect, because each thing desires its 
own perfection.  But each thing is perfect insofar as it is actual.  
Therefore it is clear that a thing is a good thing insofar as it is 
a being (ens) – for it is existence that makes all things actual…  
Hence it is clear that good thing and being are the same in 
reference.  But good thing presents the conceptual content of 
desirability, which being does not present.20    
Aquinas’s central claim in this argument is fairly clear.  Aquinas believes 
that the concepts good thing, desirable thing, perfect thing, actual thing, and being 
are all the same in reference.  That is, he believes that these concepts are all 
coextensive – they all pick out the same set of substances and properties in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  ST	  1a	  Q.5	  a.1c.	  	  My	  translation.	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world, and so each thing is good to the extent to which it is desirable, desirable to 
the extent to which it is perfect, perfect to the extent to which it is actual, and 
actual to the extent to which it is a being.  It should now be even clearer why I have 
been referring to this thesis as the ‘Coextensionality Thesis.’  Now, of course, 
Aquinas believes that all of these concepts have different conceptual contents. But 
the argument is based upon the idea that those contents are related in such a way 
that, when understood properly, one will just see that it is the case that good thing 
and being bear reference to the same thing and they differ only in conceptual 
contents. 
 Let us now turn to the task of trying to understand the connections that 
Aquinas sees between the contents of these concepts.  The first two concepts that 
Aquinas connects are good thing and desirable thing.  If, as I noted above, good 
thing has a particular substance with its essential and non-essential attributes as a 
referent in this context, it is unclear what it might even mean to say that the 
concept good thing is linked to desirable thing.  If we are to understand the 
connection between these concepts, which we must if we are to understand 
Aquinas’s Coextensionality Thesis, we must first understand a feature of Aquinas’s 
broader philosophical view, namely, his belief in universal teleology. 
 By ‘universal teleology,’ I mean the view according to which all substances 
have ends towards which they, in some sense, naturally tend. Aquinas expresses 
this general outlook by noting that “a certain inclination follows on any form 
whatever,” and, of course, all existent things have forms.21  A natural tendency of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  ST	  1a	  Q.80	  a1c.	  “considerandum	  est	  quod	  quamlibet	  formam	  sequitur	  aliqua	  inclinatio.”	  See	  also	  ST	  Q.5	  a5c.	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this kind is designated by the Latin term, ‘appetitus,’ which is often, misleadingly, 
translated into English as ‘appetite.’22  The misleading nature of this translation is 
apparent when one considers that the Latin ‘appetitus’ is derived from the Latin, 
‘adpeto,’ which means ‘to tend towards something.’  This etymological note hopefully 
makes clear that the sort of universal teleology that Aquinas embraces is not one on 
which all substances, including, e.g., rocks, literally have an appetite or desire for 
some end or set of ends.  Rather, Aquinas’s universal teleology implies only that all 
substances tend toward certain things according to their natures and that the 
things towards which they tend can be designated ‘ends.’23  Of course, Aquinas’s 
teleological view becomes more nuanced and substantive as he discusses beings 
with increasingly complex natures and forms of life.24  This is to be expected, for the 
more complex a nature and the more complex a form life the more that can impede 
a substance from properly tending towards and attaining its end(s).  In other words, 
when discussing more complex cases, one cannot just say that the end of a thing is 
that towards which a thing in fact tends because, due to some impediment or defect, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  “But	  an	  inclination	  to	  an	  end…	  follows	  from	  the	  form,	  because	  everything	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  in	  actuality	  acts	  and	  aims	  at	  that	  which	  is	  appropriate	  for	  it	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  form.”	  22	  ST	  1a	  Q.80	  a1c.	  “Hanc	  igitur	  formam	  naturalem	  sequitur	  naturalis	  inclinatio,	  quae	  appetitus	  naturalis	  vocatur.”	  Or,	  “therefore,	  this	  natural	  form	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  natural	  inclination,	  which	  is	  called	  the	  natural	  appetite.”	  23	  The	  following	  sentence	  from	  Mark	  Jordan	  lays	  out	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  Aquinas	  describes	  the	  tendencies	  of	  non-­‐rational	  beings:	  “Thomas	  speaks	  of	  the	  appetitus	  itself	  most	  often	  as	  ‘inclination,’	  but	  also	  as	  ‘natural	  desire,’	  ‘appropriateness’,	  ‘impulse,’	  or	  ‘force’	  ‘being	  ordered	  to	  something,’	  ‘seeking	  something,	  ‘tending	  towards	  something,’	  and	  ‘having	  a	  natural	  aptitude	  for	  an	  end.’”	  	  For	  more	  information	  on	  appetites,	  particularly	  insofar	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  human	  case,	  see	  Mark	  Jordan’s	  “Goodness	  and	  the	  Human	  Will,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  Philosophical	  
Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  129-­‐150.	  24	  By	  ‘nature,’	  I	  refer	  only	  to	  a	  set	  of	  capacities	  that	  one	  has	  as	  a	  member	  of	  one’s	  kind.	  	  For	  a	  discussion	  concerning	  Aquinas’s	  views	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  thing’s	  nature,	  its	  capacities,	  its	  acts,	  and	  its	  objects,	  see	  John	  Finnis,	  Aquinas:	  Moral,	  Political,	  and	  Legal	  Theory,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  29	  ff.	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more complex things may tend towards the wrong sorts of things even though they, 
in some sense, have a more fundamental tendency that, again due to impediment or 
defect, does not move the thing.  For example, in the case of human beings, because 
we have a rational nature that can be compromised in various ways, many will fail 
to approach the final human end, even though we all desire to attain it in the sense 
that we desire complete satisfaction of our appetites, which – by definition – can 
only be had in the attainment of our final end.25 
 Now with Aquinas’s broader view in mind we are in a better position to 
answer the question: how do the contents of the concepts good thing and desirable 
thing relate insofar as they concern substances?  First, it is important to note that 
the phrase Aquinas uses that may be translated, ‘desirable thing,’ is ‘aliquid 
appetibile.’26  So a thing should be considered an appetibile thing, in the relevant 
sense, insofar as it is a thing that is, in some sense, tended towards.  (In what 
follows, I will retain the Latin ‘appetibile’ in order to avoid the possible confusion 
that may follow upon the use of the term ‘desirable,’ which seems appropriate only 
to sentient beings.) And, according to Aquinas’s universal teleological view, among 
the things tended toward are the ends of substances.  Indeed, on Aquinas’s view, the 
ends of substances hold a special place among appetibile things because the 
attainment of its end is that towards which a thing tends most (at least by nature, 
when unimpeded by relevant defect or impediment).  So, the most appetibile thing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Indeed,	  the	  whole	  of	  Aquinas’s	  De	  Malo,	  which	  includes	  chapters	  on	  sin,	  the	  causes	  of	  sin,	  and	  on	  the	  specific	  natures	  of	  individual	  vices	  (e.g.	  anger	  and	  avarice),	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  spell	  out	  many	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  human	  beings	  may	  go	  wrong	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  their	  final	  end.	  	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  Richard	  Regan	  (tr.),	  De	  Malo,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Press,	  2001).	  26	  ST	  1a	  Q.5,	  a1c.	  
	   16	  
to any given thing, x, is x’s end as a substance. Thus, Aquinas quotes Aristotle with 
approval as saying, “good is that towards which each thing tends,” and, as we noted, 
each thing tends towards its own end.27 
 It should now be clear that the content included in the concept appetibile 
thing in the context of this argument is quite narrow in much the same way as the 
concept good thing. And so, the connection between the content of bonum and the 
content of aliquid appetibile in this context is rather bland.  It amounts to little 
more than noting that each substance tends towards its own end and, because there 
is a more general link between being good and being appetibile, we can ascertain 
from this tendency that being a good thing is related to being the sort of thing that 
successfully tends towards its own end.  And so we have a sense of what is included 
in the concept of bonum in the context of the argument.  But, as of yet, we have not 
addressed the nature of bonum.28  That is, we have not yet considered in virtue of 
what a thing truly is a good thing.  In Aquinas’s view, what it is to be a good thing 
(or the nature of being a good thing) is connected to what it is to be a perfect thing.  
So, if one remains unconvinced that bonum and aliquid appetibile are connected 
conceptually in any helpful sort of way, it is important to note that, for the purposes 
of this project going forward, the conceptual connection between good thing and 
appetibile thing is far less important than the connection between good thing and 
perfect thing.  Indeed, even Aquinas seems to recognize that one might bypass 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  ST	  1a	  Q.1,	  a.5c.	  	  My	  translation.	  “Bonum	  est	  quod	  omnia	  appetunt.”	  28	  I	  owe	  this	  distinction	  to	  Jan	  Aertsen	  and	  his	  chapter,	  “Thomas	  Aquinas	  on	  the	  Good:	  The	  Relation	  between	  Metaphysics	  and	  Ethics,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  and	  Eleonore	  Stump,	  Aquinas’s	  Moral	  Theory:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  
Norman	  Kretzmann,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  240.	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appetibile thing in seeking to understand the nature of bonum (but clearly not the 
concept).  For he says, “good thing signifies perfect thing, which is desirable.”29 And 
it is to the connection between good thing and perfect thing that Aquinas’s 
argument turns next.  
 After claiming that there is a connection between bonum and aliquid 
appetibile, Aquinas says, “it is clear that each thing is appetibile insofar as it is 
perfect, because each thing desires its own perfection.”30 The idea seems to be that a 
thing is a good thing insofar as it is an appetibile thing and it is an appetibile thing 
insofar as it is perfect thing.31  So, from the perspective of a given substance, x, if 
attaining x’s end as a substance is that towards which it tends most (if attaining its 
end is the most appetibile), then the good of a particular substance, x, is related to x 
attaining its end.  More particularly, x is a good thing, considered as a substance, 
insofar as x is equipped to attain x’s end. And what it is to be equipped to attain an 
end as a thing is to have the attributes appropriate to attaining the end.32  When a 
thing has the attributes that are appropriate to attaining its end, that thing is 
called a perfect member of its kind; or, in Aquinas’s words, “a thing is said to be 
perfect if it lacks nothing in accordance with the mode of its perfection.”33  Thus, a 
substance, x, is a good thing in virtue of being a perfect member of its kind. So the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  ST	  1a,	  Q.5,	  a.1	  ad1.	  My	  translation.	  “bonum	  dicit	  rationem	  perfecti,	  quod	  est	  appetibile.”	  30	  ST	  1a	  Q.5,	  a1	  ad1.	  My	  translation.	  “Manifestum	  est	  autem	  quod	  unumquodque	  est	  appetibile	  secundum	  quod	  est	  perfectum,	  nam	  omnia	  appetunt	  suam	  perfectionem.”	  31	  Thomas	  Aquinas.	  	  Summa	  Contra	  Gentiles	  I.37.	  “That	  by	  which	  anything	  is	  said	  to	  be	  good	  is	  its	  proper	  virtue…	  but	  a	  virtue	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  perfection,	  for	  we	  say	  that	  anything	  is	  perfect	  when	  it	  attains	  its	  proper	  virtue,	  as	  is	  clear	  in	  Physics	  VII.	  	  And	  so	  everything	  is	  good	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  perfect.	  	  And	  that	  is	  why	  everything	  desires	  its	  own	  perfection	  as	  its	  proper	  good.”	  32	  ST	  1a	  Q.5,	  a1	  ad3.	  “bonum	  dicitur	  secundum	  magis	  et	  minus,	  secundem	  actum	  supervenientem;	  puta	  secundum	  scientiam	  vel	  virtutem.”	  Or,	  “good	  is	  spoken	  of	  more	  or	  less	  according	  to	  a	  thing’s	  non-­‐essential	  concrete	  attributes;	  for	  example,	  knowledge	  or	  virtue.”	  33	  ST	  1a	  Q.5	  a5c.	  	  According	  to	  Aquinas,	  the	  mode	  of	  a	  thing’s	  perfection	  is	  given	  it	  by	  its	  form.	  
	   18	  
nature of bonum – that in virtue of which a thing is a good thing – is related to 
perfection, whereas the concept of bonum – the content included in the concept – is 
related to being desirable.  
 To get clearer on the relations that are thought to hold between good thing, 
desirable thing, and perfect thing, let us consider the case of an oak tree.  For any 
given oak tree, attaining its ends as an oak tree is that towards which it tends most.  
These ends are self-maintenance and reproduction; we believe this is so because the 
parts, characteristics, and functions of an oak tree can all be explained with 
reference to these two ends.  Because being a good thing is related to tending 
towards the end(s) of that thing, we have reason to believe that being a good oak 
tree is related to attaining the ends of self-maintenance and reproduction.  More 
particularly, we have reason to believe that this oak tree is a good oak tree, 
considered as an oak tree, insofar as it is equipped to attain its ends as an oak tree. 
Now, for an oak tree, what it is to be equipped to attain its ends is to have certain 
attributes that help it to maintain itself and reproduce itself – attributes like 
having strong roots and healthy leaves.  If an oak tree has all the attributes 
relevant to maintaining itself and reproducing, we would call it a perfect oak tree, 
considered in itself.  And so, in the case of an oak tree, we can conclude that an oak 
tree is a good oak tree in virtue of being a perfect oak tree; that is, in virtue of 
having the set of attributes that characteristically allow oak trees to attain their 
ends. 
 Here one might reasonably ask, if the most desirable thing to a substance, x, 
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is to attain its end, then shouldn’t a substance be considered good to the extent to 
which it attains its end? Why think that what it is to be a good thing is related to 
having certain attributes that allow a thing to attain its end(s) rather than think 
that a thing is good to the extent to which it has attained its end(s)? 
 Here I think it is important to remember that what we are discussing is what 
it is to be a good substance.  This objection rests on the idea that the more 
important case of goodness is related to judgments about something other than 
substances; perhaps what such an objector has in mind is the goodness related to 
judgments of welfare.  If the end of a thing were only to have certain sorts of 
attributes, then – of course, substances, considered in themselves, could achieve 
ends.  However, in most cases, we take the end(s) of a substance to be at least 
partially distinct from the attributes of that substance.  This is particularly clear in 
two sorts of cases: (1) a case in which a thing has all the attributes that a thing 
should have as a perfect member of its kind, but fails to attain its end(s); and (2) a 
case in which a thing attains its ends even though it lacks attributes that we think 
it ought to have to be a perfect member of its kind.  As an example of the first sort of 
case, a rusty red fox squirrel with all the attributes relevant to its perfection may 
swiftly climb into a tree only to be snatched by a large hawk and so, despite its 
perfection, fail to preserve itself.  As an example of the second sort of case, imagine 
a rusty red fox squirrel that lacks attributes related to being a good climber.  
Imagine further that, in part because of this defect, the squirrel is captured and put 
into a zoo where he is given ample food and lady squirrels with which to mate.  In 
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the case of the first squirrel, it seems that it is a good squirrel (considered as a 
substance) that ran into some bad luck and so did not achieve its ends.  In the 
second case, it seems that it is a bad squirrel (considered as a substance) that ran 
into some good luck and so achieved its ends.  So, in assessing the goodness of the 
squirrels, where goodness is an assessment of their character as substances and not 
an assessment of welfare, it seems that the relevant considerations have to do with 
the attributes of the animals and not end-attainment.34  
 Thus far, I have attempted to show the connections between the content of 
the concepts: good thing, appetibile thing, and perfect thing.  Of course, Aquinas is 
not satisfied in showing just these connections because it is his belief that good 
thing ultimately is the same in reference as being.  Thus, after introducing the 
connection between appetibile thing and perfect thing, Aquinas claims, “each thing 
is perfect insofar as it is actual.”35  That is, he claims that what it is to be a perfect 
thing is to be an actualized thing.   
 But what does it mean to be an actualized thing?  Although a full explanation 
of this notion as Aquinas understood it would require a diversion into substantial 
forms and substantial and accidental being, for the purposes of this chapter and 
this project, such a diversion is unnecessary.  In effect, Aquinas believes that every 
member of a given kind has certain capacities just in virtue of being a member of 
that kind.36  However, those capacities in themselves do nothing to ensure that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  For	  a	  similar	  discussion,	  see	  Philippa	  Foot,	  Natural	  Goodness,	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2001),	  34.	  35	  ST	  1a	  Q.5	  a1c.	  “intantum	  est	  autem	  perfectum	  unumquodque,	  inquantum	  est	  actu.”	  36	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  example	  of	  Aquinas’s	  views	  regarding	  a	  form’s	  conferring	  capacities	  is	  the	  human	  case.	  	  For	  Aquinas’s	  views	  on	  human	  nature,	  see	  ST	  1a	  Q.75-­‐102.	  	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  Aquinas’s	  views	  on	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are well used.  Indeed, in many cases, things have capacities that can’t genuinely be 
used at all without the proper sorts of attributes.  In the context of good things, 
‘actuality’ is Aquinas’s term for having the attributes that make a thing’s capacities 
function as they ought, given the nature of the thing. For example, an oak tree 
would be actual (or possess actuality) to the extent to which it had the attributes 
that make it function well as an oak tree. So there is something in virtue of which a 
thing is a thing of its kind, namely, its nature, which just is a set of capacities that 
follow upon being a thing of a particular kind.  And there is something else in virtue 
of which a thing realizes that set of capacities and so is a perfected member of its 
kind, namely, actuality.  Given this brief discussion, the connection between 
actualized thing and perfect thing should be clear: A perfect thing is perfect in 
virtue of being an actualized thing and it is perfect to the extent to which it is 
actualized.37 
   And now for the final steps in Aquinas’s argument.  As I noted above, 
‘actuality’ is Aquinas’s name for that in virtue of which a thing realizes a set of 
capacities, and because capacities can be realized to varying degrees (e.g. over the 
course of my life, the realization of my rational faculties may vary), Aquinas 
considers a thing actual to the extent to which the capacities afforded to it by its 
nature are realized. So, just as we said that a thing is a good thing to the extent to 
which it is perfect, we can also say that a thing is good to the extent to which it is 
actual.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  human	  nature,	  see	  Robert	  Pasnau,	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  on	  Human	  Nature,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  	  37	  ST	  1a2ae	  Q.3	  a2c.	  	  “Anything	  whatever	  is	  perfect	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  in	  actuality.”	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 Now, according to Aquinas, the conceptual content of being is actualized 
thing; that is, being includes as content the notion that a particular thing exists 
with a set of real attributes.  This connection is quite natural, for being an 
actualized thing involves the concrete existence of a substances with a set of non-
essential concrete properties, and a being just is a thing of this kind. 
 So now the conceptual connections at every stage of Aquinas’s argument 
should be clearer.  If the concepts are understood in this way, one can understand 
why Aquinas held the Coextensionality Thesis; that is, one can understand why he 
believed that the concepts good thing, desirable thing, perfect thing, actualized 
thing, and being are all the same in reference.  For if the contents of these concepts 
are as Aquinas suggested, it seems at least plausible to believe that the connections 
that he saw between them are genuine connections and so, in fact, these concepts 
all share the same reference and differ only in content.38 
§3: The Coextensionality Thesis as a form of synthetic reductionism 
 Before considering objections to the thesis, I want to explain why I take this 
to be a form of synthetic reductionism.  That is, I want to make clearer why I think 
that the view implies that “the meaning of ‘good’ cannot be given using non-
evaluative expressions, [but] one can explain what goodness is using non-evaluative 
expressions.”39  By placing the thesis firmly into contemporary metaethical debates, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  For	  more	  information	  on	  this	  thesis	  as	  I	  have	  defended	  it,	  I	  recommend	  two	  book	  chapters	  in	  particular.	  Though,	  admittedly,	  they	  cover	  much	  the	  same	  ground.	  	  Eleonore	  Stump’s	  “Goodness”	  in	  her	  monograph	  
Aquinas,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2003),	  61-­‐91.	  And	  Eleonore	  Stump	  and	  Norman	  Kretzmann’s	  “Being	  and	  Goodness”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  
Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  98-­‐128.	  39	  Huemer,	  xii.	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I hope to both further clarify its meaning and to make it seem more plausible, which 
– of course – mirrors the twofold intent of the chapter. 
 The meaning of ‘synthetic reductionism,’ as applied to metaethics, is best 
understood by way of analogy.  Consider the concepts water and H2O.  These 
concepts differ in content, as demonstrated by the fact that the question, “What is 
the chemical formula of water?” does not mean the same thing as the question, 
“What is the chemical formula of H2O?”40  But they share a reference, namely, 
molecules in which two hydrogen atoms are bonded in a particular sort of way to 
one oxygen atom.  However, even though the contents of the concepts water and 
H2O differ, what it is to be water is, in a sense, reducible to being H2O.  That is, we 
believe that the nature of water is its being H2O even though the contents of the 
concept water is not (or at least need not be) connected to H2O, as the fact that long 
before the advent of modern chemistry the concept water was understood and 
deployed accurately.41  How does the case of water and H2O relate to metaethics? 
 It seems that there are three features of the case of water and H2O that 
might suggest a certain sort of metaethical view.  Just as water and H2O differ in 
their conceptual contents, so too may good and some other non-evaluative concept 
or statement differ in their conceptual contents.  But just as water and H2O share 
their referent, so too may good and this other non-evaluative concept or statement 
share a referent.  And, then, perhaps just as what it is to be water is ultimately 
reducible to its being H2O, so too may what it is to be good be reducible to that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Huemer,	  228.	  41	  Huemer,	  83,	  ff.	  and	  228.	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concept or statement that includes no evaluative terms.42 
 So there seem to be three features of synthetic reductionistic metaethical 
views concerning the concept good: (1) the contents of the concepts good and (fill in 
the blank) differ; (2) the reference of the concepts good and (fill in the blank) are the 
same; and (3) what it is to be good is reducible to its being (fill in the blank).  It 
should be clear that these three features of synthetic reductionistic metaethical 
views in general are shared by the metaethical thesis under consideration.  For (1) 
good thing and being are thought to have different conceptual contents; (2) good 
thing and being are both thought to bear reference to substances and their non-
essential concrete attributes (they share a referent); and (3) what it is to be a good 
thing is ultimately reducible to any of three non-evaluative concepts – perfect thing, 
actualized thing, and being. 
 Now, with a better sense of where the thesis fits into contemporary 
metaethical debates, let us turn to the obvious sorts of objections that will be raised 
against the view – one of which is an objection to synthetic reductionism of 
whatever kind. 
§4: Objections to the thesis 
 There are at least two rather obvious sorts of objections that one might raise 
against the view that I have exposited and defended.  One involves the belief in 
teleology.  The other involves the form of the view, namely, that it is a form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Huemer,	  228.	  If	  such	  a	  view	  of	  good	  were	  correct,	  then	  one	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  a	  naturalistic	  view	  of	  the	  good	  despite	  G.E.	  Moore’s	  open	  question	  argument.	  	  For	  Moore’s	  argument	  is	  only	  effective	  if	  we	  take	  good	  and	  some	  expression	  to	  have	  precisely	  the	  same	  conceptual	  contents.	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synthetic reductionism.  In this section, I will consider both of these sorts of 
objections in turn. 
Objection 1: Teleology is exceedingly implausible 
 A first objection to the above account is that it requires a teleological 
worldview that has been discredited by evolution.  Plants and animals, including 
human beings, do not have ends given to them by God or Nature.  Therefore, any 
view of goodness that requires that biological entities have ends must be rejected.   
 Keith Ansell Pearson and John Dupré have raised this sort of objection, 
among others.  While reprimanding those who posit anything like a human essence, 
Pearson says, “essentialist ontologies like Debord’s erase the trace of everything 
that has been discovered about the human animal and evolution since the middle of 
the nineteenth century, as if Darwin, Freud, Leri-Gourhan, and Simondon had 
never existed.”43 I think that, in this passage, Pearson expresses a fairly common 
sentiment about views of the kind that I am defending.  
Response  
 The view I am defending cannot be plausibly maintained without recourse to 
teleology.44 Having said that, obviously, anything like a full defense of even 
biological teleology – leaving aside universal teleology – would take us well beyond 
the scope of this chapter and this project.  So, in what follows, it is my hope to 
achieve the modest aim of showing that such a view is not absolutely untenable. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Keith	  Ansell	  Pearson,	  “Timely	  Meditations	  on	  the	  Transhuman	  Condition:	  Nihilism,	  Entropy,	  and	  Beyond,”	  in	  Virod	  Life:	  Perspectives	  on	  Nietzsche	  and	  the	  Transhuman	  Condition,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1997),	  160.	  44	  For	  an	  examination	  of	  why	  this	  is	  so,	  see	  Jonathan	  Jacobs,	  “Metaethics	  and	  Teleology.”	  The	  Review	  of	  
Metaphysics	  (September	  2001),	  41-­‐55.	  
	   26	  
will do so by noting that the teleological outlook that this view requires need not 
embrace belief in God or anthropomorphized Nature, nor such things as fixed 
essences and biological natural kinds. 
 If we reject belief in God, it is natural to ask, where are we to think these 
ends come from?  It is clear from the work of, among others, Richard Cameron that 
belief in God or an anthropomorphic Nature is not required for belief in irreducible 
teleology in biological life.  For Cameron defends a naturalistic teleological view on 
which teleological properties constitute a sui generis feature of biological entities. In 
arguing for this view, Cameron considers and rejects the notion that one must 
choose between some sort of supernaturalism and eliminitivism in regards to 
teleology in biological life.45  So it seems that the notion that biological entities 
possess ends and are end directed is at least defensible. Of course, many will object 
to Cameron’s proposal, but I take his proposal as evidence that the thesis is not 
entirely untenable simply in virtue of embracing a form of teleology.  
 But even if in any given case a biological entity will have teleological 
properties of a kind, the structure of the teleology employed by the metaethical 
thesis under consideration may seem to force one to embrace highly contentious 
entities, such as fixed essences and natural kinds.  I will briefly argue that one who 
accepts the metaethical thesis need not accept the existence of such things.   
 First, let us consider fixed essences.  A view of the sort that I am defending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Richard	  Cameron,	  “How	  to	  be	  a	  realist	  about	  sui	  generis	  teleology	  yet	  feel	  at	  home	  in	  the	  21st	  century,”	  The	  
Monist,	  (vol.	  87,	  no.	  1,	  2004),	  72-­‐95.	  	  See	  also	  Richard	  Cameron,	  Teleology	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  Contemporary	  
Philosophy	  of	  Biology:	  An	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  life.	  (PhD	  Dissertation,	  University	  of	  Colorado	  –	  Boulder,	  2000).	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need not claim that creatures have fixed essences.  That is, it need not be the case 
that parents and children have precisely the same set of essential attributes, nor 
that all members of a kind have precisely the same essential attributes. All that is 
required is that (1) there be some set of ends that a being has in virtue of being an 
entity of its kind and (2) there be a set of characteristic ways in which these ends 
are attained that generally require a set of attributes or perfections.  So the view 
clearly does not depend upon beliefs concerning fixed essences.  
 But perhaps this is too quick.  For in answering Pearson’s objection I have 
appealed to the language of ‘kinds.’ John Dupré argues vigorously against the 
notion that there are biological natural kinds and, in light of the above response, it 
seems that the view that I am defending requires that there be biological natural 
kinds.46   
 It seems to me that Dupré himself provides the beginning of an answer to 
this sort of objection, at least insofar as the problem of biological natural kinds 
relates to the thesis that I am defending.  For he says, “the compilation of such a list 
[of biological universals, or behaviors that all humans seem to participate in] surely 
shows that there is something that might be called a natural history of Homo 
sapiens, but perhaps there is nevertheless nothing in such a project that answers to 
traditional conceptions of human nature.  The creature behaves in various more or 
less characteristic ways, and often it is pretty obvious why it does so.”47  Here Dupré 
notes that even if there is no such thing as a human essence or human nature, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  See	  John	  Dupré,	  The	  Disorder	  of	  Things,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  47	  John	  Dupré,	  “On	  Human	  Nature,”	  Human	  Affairs,	  (vol.	  13,	  no.	  2,	  December	  2003,	  109-­‐122),	  110.	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still may be able to give some sort of natural-historical account of what the life of a 
being properly referred to by the designation Homo sapiens is like.  Michael 
Thompson and Philippa Foot have both argued that normative judgments are 
related, not to the essences of things, but to natural-history propositions of the kind 
that Dupré is acknowledging.  Their basic approach also happens to be very similar 
to the thesis that I have been defending.  They suggest that “if we have a true 
natural-history proposition to the effect that S’s are F, then if a certain individual S 
– the individual here and now or then and there – is not F it is therefore not as it 
should be, but rather, weak, diseased, or in some other way defective.”48 So, 
according to Thompson and Foot, it is reasonable to believe that natural historical 
knowledge can help us to ground claims about what it is to be a perfect member of a 
natural historical grouping, or kind.  If that is so, then it seems that the thesis 
remains defensible even in the face of work like Dupré’s because all that the thesis I 
am defending requires is that things have ends as members of natural historical 
groupings (although, the view would admittedly be more compelling if biological 
entities were genuine natural kinds). So, for the purposes of this project, if one 
objects to the notion of biological natural kinds, one can understand “kinds talk” as 
“natural historical talk” (or talk about concrete resemblances between beings 
connected by a natural history). 
Because I take Foot and Thompson’s project to be defensible and similar to the 
thesis I am defending in all respects relevant to these objections, we can safely put 
aside the highly contentious debate concerning biological life and natural kinds.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Foot,	  30.	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 But there is one more objection that must be dealt with under the heading of 
‘teleology.’ For doesn’t the thesis presume universal teleology and not just teleology 
about biological entities?  And, although some may defend biological teleology, 
surely no one would defend universal teleology except for supernaturalists.  So we 
ought to reject the thesis because it rests on such an implausible foundation. 
 Here, rather than offering one possible answer to this sort of objection, I will 
offer three. 
 First, one may accept that all things have been created by God and were 
made in such a way that God remains their end.  This sort of view on which God is 
both Source and Final End was held by Psuedo-Dionysius and remains the view of 
some Catholic philosopher-theologians today.49 
 Second, one could deny universal teleology and embrace some limited version 
of teleology.  For example, one could accept that life forms have ends, but non-life 
forms do not. This would amount to a rejection of the Coextensionality Thesis as I 
have defended it.  For universal teleology is built into the Thesis as I have defended 
it because I have claimed that it is applicable to all substances in virtue of the fact 
that all substances have ends of a sort.  However, it seems that one might limit the 
application of the thesis to, e.g., biological entities and still accept the main thrust 
of the Coextensionality Thesis that, in some set of things, what it is for them to be 
good things is for them to be appetibile things, what it is for them to be appetibile 
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  See	  for	  a	  contemporary	  example,	  W.	  Norris	  Clarke,	  S.J.	  	  The	  One	  and	  the	  Many:	  A	  contemporary	  Thomistic	  
metaphysics,	  (Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  2001).	  	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  views	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Frederick	  Copleston,	  A	  History	  of	  Philosophy:	  Volume	  2,	  Medieval	  Philosophy,	  Augustine	  to	  
Scotus.	  (London:	  Burns	  Oates	  &	  Washbourne	  Ltd.,	  1950.	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things is for them to be perfect things and what it is for them to be perfect things is 
for them to be actualized things and what it is for them to be actualized things is for 
them to be beings.  Such an individual might support a view on which only 
biological entities are capable of being good things in the relevant sense because 
only they have ends in virtue of which there is a set of attributes characteristically 
required for attaining those ends.  
 Finally, one might try to tell a deflationary story similar to the one I 
suggested as I introduced the notion of universal teleology.  On such a view, all 
substances are thought to have ends towards which they, in some sense, naturally 
tend.  How this sort of story goes with plants and animals is relatively clear.  The 
difficult cases seem to be non-living natural things and artifacts.  Here it seems like 
there are two possible paths for one telling this deflationary story.  First, one could 
argue that only non-living natural things have ends in the relevant sense.  So, for 
example, a rock’s natural end as a substance may be remaining the kind of rock 
that it is and it certainly will have a tendency to do so.  Although they at least seem 
to have artificial ends, the thesis may be seen as inapplicable to artifacts, perhaps 
because they are not considered substances in the relevant sense. Or, second, one 
could accept that both non-living natural things and artifacts have ends in the 
relevant sense. Then both non-living natural things and artifacts could at least in 
principle be evaluated by the lights of the Coextensionality Thesis. 
 In the next chapter, I will defend a view of this third kind, but I take it that 
any of these three proposals is defensible. 
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Objection 2: As a form of synthetic reductionism, the view faces two serious problems 
Problem 1: The difference between evaluative and natural properties 
“Evaluative properties seem, on their face, to be radically different in kind from 
natural properties. Being good, for instance, is obviously a different kind of thing 
from being round, weighing 200 pounds, or being positively charged.  This can be 
seen on the basis of one’s grasp of the concepts of the relevant properties, just as one 
can see, solely on the basis of one’s understanding of the concept of a symphony and 
the concept of a planet, that the planet Neptune is not Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony.”50 
Response 
 It can, of course, be granted that being good is a very different sort of thing 
from being round.  But, from this, it does not follow that what it is to be good is not 
reducible to some formula that contains no evaluative terms.  Although the 
Coextentionality Thesis permits of various formulations that state what it is to be 
good (e.g. a thing is good insofar as it is a being, or an actualized thing), the formula 
that seems the most informative and straightforward is as follows: a thing is a good 
thing insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind. One its face, it seems that I have 
included an evaluative term in the formula – namely, ‘perfect.’  But what it is to be 
‘perfect’ in the relevant sense is itself reducible.  To be a perfect member of a kind is 
to have the attributes that are characteristically required for a being of its kind to 
reach its end(s).  Now, do ‘good thing’ and ‘thing having the attributes that are 
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characteristically required for a being of its kind to reach its end(s)’ seem like 
utterly unrelated sorts of things, like Neptune and Beethoveen’s Ninth Symphony?  
I don’t believe so. 
 But there is a related worry.  It seems that, if we take good thing to be 
ultimately reducible to a set of attributes, then some attributes will be both good-
making and bad-making, which seems absurd.  For example, in the case of a 
Tasmanian Devil blackness is a good-making attribute, but in a polar bear it is a 
bad-making attribute.  So it seems that the absurdity that precisely the same 
attribute can be both good-making and bad-making follows from accepting this sort 
of reductive account of what it is to be a good thing.   
 Built into this understanding of being good is what we might call ‘object-
dependence.’ In other words, the natural properties (or attributes) in virtue of which 
a thing is a perfect member of its kind will differ on the basis of the kind of thing 
that it is.  And, although one must have those natural properties (or attributes) in 
order to be good, a natural property is good-making only given further facts about 
the thing’s form of life and the properties needed to make it a perfect member of its 
kind.  So, indeed, in one type of being, a natural property may be a good-making 
property and in another it may be a bad-making property – e.g. blackness in a 
Tasmanian Devil and blackness in a polar bear.  Thus, it is right to say that being 
good cannot strictly be reduced to even a very large set of natural properties 
because some properties will be good-making for some and bad-making for others.  
But this is not an absurdity.  It follows quite naturally from the account of being a 
	   33	  
good thing that I have defended.  And it seems to me that this sort of ‘object-
dependence’ is a strength of the thesis, rather than a problem. 
Problem 2: The inability to explain moral knowledge  
 “The second problem is that synthetic reductionists cannot explain moral 
knowledge.  We do not know about wrongness in the way we know about water – we 
cannot observe with the five senses that an act is wrong.  Nor, according to the 
synthetic reductionists, can we know that an act is wrong by intuition.  Nor can one 
deduce evaluative propositions from non-evaluative premises.”51   
Response 
 The problem of explaining moral knowledge actually seems to be two 
problems: (1) how do we know that a particular thing is good?  And (2) how can we 
come to know that being good is reducible to some formula devoid of evaluative 
terms?  The first problem of moral knowledge is not a serious problem for a view of 
the sort that I am defending.  For it won’t be particularly difficult to know that a 
particular thing is good if, given knowledge about the kind of thing the thing is, 
what it is to be good can be reduced to a set of natural properties.  If what it is to be 
good could be reduced to a set of natural properties, then surely we could interact 
with a set of natural properties through our senses and scientific equipment, and 
discover whether or not a particular thing were in fact good, again assuming that 
we knew which attributes characteristically allow things of the particular kind to 
attain their end(s).   	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 One might object to this claim by noting that I have implied, perhaps 
implausibly, that we can straightforwardly determine both what the ends of a given 
thing are and what attributes a thing of a particular kind ordinarily has in order to 
attain those ends. 
 I hope that I have not made it seem as though I think that it is, in all cases, 
straightforwardly clear what the ends of a given type of thing are and what 
attributes such a thing ordinarily has in order to attain those ends.  Although I 
believe that the examples involving plants, for instance, are plausible, I do not 
think that I have given anything like a comprehensive account of what it means to 
be, e.g., a good oak tree.  My examples were only meant to show in very basic 
outline what such an account would look like in practice.  To respond to this moral 
knowledge objection, all that I need to show is that what is required for a being to 
be a perfect member of its kind, including human beings, can at least in principle be 
discovered empirically.  And I believe that it is clear that, at least in the biological 
sciences, we have made progress in making sense of the ends and vital attributes of 
plants and animals because such things can, in fact, be discovered empirically.  
These discoveries should give us hope for the human case, but here it is important 
to acknowledge that, because human beings are a unique case, I do not believe that 
the biological sciences can tell us everything that we need to know about what it is 
to be a good human being.  However, it does seem clear to me that a botanist knows 
a great deal about, e.g. the attributes, functions, and ends of an oak tree and that 
this information can be used to determine whether or not a particular oak tree is a 
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good oak tree, given my account of being good.  And, further, that such progress 
suggests that, at least in principle, something similar might be learned through the 
study of human beings and human cultures. 
 But now let us consider the main thrust of Huemer’s objection – the second 
sort of moral knowledge objection, which suggests that there is no plausible story 
that can be told about how we could come to know that being good is reducible to a 
formula without any evaluative terms. In the case of the metaethical view we’re 
now considering, the question would be: how can we (or how did we) come to know 
that being a good x is reducible to being a perfect member of x’s kind?   
 What follows is not a full account of precisely how we came to know that 
being a good x is reducible to being a perfect member of one’s kind, but I hope to 
show that it is at least plausible to believe that we could discover what being good 
is, if a thing truly is good in virtue of being a perfect member of its kind.  It seems 
that there are at least two relevant sorts of reflections: (1) reflections on language 
usage and (2) reflections on features of human life. 
 How we apply a property-term is not a perfect indicator of what the term 
refers to because, among other reasons, (1) we may be mistaken about a given thing 
(e.g. think that a light thing is heavy) and (2) language usage may change (e.g. 
awesome is now a property of French fries).  However, it is very likely that there are 
at least some cases concerning any given property about which all competent users 
of a language would agree.  In the case of good, we might expect that all people 
would call a tall stable oak tree with deep roots and green leaves a good oak tree.  
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We might also expect all competent English language users to call a healthy 
thoroughbred horse a good horse and a bottle opener that effortless opens bottles a 
good bottle opener.  Of course, the question as to what a term is picking out in the 
world is not settled by its use in ordinary language or a discussion of paradigm 
cases.  But we would expect that whatever property or properties the term is 
picking out would be found in all the agreed upon, or paradigm, cases.  As it is 
obvious why all three of these example entities would be good on the account I’m 
defending, I will not spend time explaining what makes them good. Of course, the 
case that we are really concerned about is the case of human moral goodness.  
Although the three cases I have described may provide some evidence for the belief 
that being a good thing is reducible to being a perfect member of that thing’s kind, 
these examples provide no direct evidence for the claim that the human case is 
identical to these.  Admittedly this is the case.  However, if the concept good x (or 
good thing) is deployed univocally in English when it is used with regard to 
substances, then, of course, it follows that human beings (considered as substances) 
are good insofar as they are perfect members of the human kind.  It is well beyond 
the scope of this essay to argue for the conclusion that the concept is deployed 
univocally in these cases, but I think it is at least plausible to believe that it is so 
deployed, at least when deployed rightly. 
 Beyond the evidence of the term’s use in ordinary language, we also need 
some story about how we could have come to know that a thing is good in virtue of 
its being a perfect member of its kind in the first place.  In this vein, let us turn to 
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certain features of human life.  It is not hard to imagine an early herdsman looking 
at two animals and noting that one of them had natural properties that generally 
lead to early death and failure to reproduce (e.g. very small and thin, and/or blind).  
It seems that on this basis, he may (perhaps in conjunction with other herdsman) 
begin to distinguish between animals that fall into two general categories – what we 
would call, good animals and bad animals.  These categories may have become 
more refined over time as the herdsmen learned that some more subtle natural 
properties also tend to lead to premature death or failure to reproduce (e.g. a 
certain defect in the mouth).  But, in the end, we might expect him to be able to 
distinguish with some accuracy between animals that are perfect members of their 
kinds and those with defects and that he would use a term to pick out the perfect 
members. We could imagine a similar story about farmers who note certain traits 
related to thriving plants and distinguishing between plants on that basis.  It seems 
possible that in this way terms like good and bad began to pick out perfect and 
imperfect members of kinds, respectively.  This understanding may then have been 
transferred to artifacts, such as carts and houses; perhaps they thought, a good 
house is one that protects us from the elements because what it is to be a house is to 
be a thing that protects one from the elements.  And, indeed, the same sort of 
development may have taken place in regards to human beings.  Of course, what it 
is to be a perfect human being is far more contentious than what it is to be a good 
sheep.  However, the fact that there is disagreement on the issue is not in and of 
itself conclusive evidence either that (1) this is not the appropriate formal account of 
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what it is to be a good human being (namely, the account that a human being is 
good insofar as she has the attributes that characteristically allow her to attain the 
human end) and (2) that there is no fact of the matter about what it is to be a good 
human being because, if there is a human end or set of ends, we could certainly 
have them without having knowledge of them (and the lack of knowledge would 
inevitably lead to disagreement). 
 Of course, this is highly speculative and extremely sketchy.  I offer it not 
because it is essential that we came to understand goodness just so.  Rather, I want 
it to be clear that it seems, at the very least, possible that we did in fact discover 
what it is for a substance to be good by interacting with the world.  For the purposes 
of responding to Huemer’s objection, it seems that it is enough to say that the sort of 
view I am defended is supported by (or at the very least is consistent with) 
paradigm cases of good things and it seems at least plausible to believe that we 
could discover that what it is to be a good substance is to be a perfect member of a 
kind.52 
§5: The Coextensionality Thesis moving forward 
 As I dealt with the above objections, it may have become clear that I prefer 
the following formulation concerning what it is to be a good thing: a thing, x, is good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Someone	  might	  also	  object	  that	  he	  view	  only	  addresses	  a	  very	  limited	  topic	  in	  metaethics,	  namely	  the	  question:	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  is	  a	  thing,	  x,	  a	  good	  x?	  	  What	  answer	  does	  it	  provide	  to	  the	  question,	  “What	  makes	  a	  given	  action	  right?”	  	  	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  general	  thrust	  of	  this	  objection.	  I	  have	  not	  explained,	  nor	  do	  I	  intend	  to	  explain,	  what	  it	  is	  for	  an	  action	  to	  be	  right.	  	  Some	  will	  find	  this	  unsatisfying.	  	  I	  take	  explaining	  what	  underlies	  true	  claims	  about	  rightness	  to	  be	  a	  distinct	  project,	  one	  that	  may	  be	  guided	  by	  one’s	  understanding	  of	  being	  good,	  but	  which	  may	  also	  –	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  –	  be	  pursued	  entirely	  independently	  of	  one’s	  beliefs	  about	  what	  is	  good.	  	  So,	  rather	  than	  addressing	  the	  question,	  “In	  virtue	  of	  what	  are	  all	  evaluative	  propositions	  true	  or	  false?”	  I	  have	  focused	  upon	  the	  far	  narrower	  question,	  “In	  virtue	  of	  what	  is	  a	  thing,	  x,	  a	  good	  x?”	  	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  subject	  matter	  necessitated	  such	  an	  approach.	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insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind.  I will make extensive use of this 
formulation in Chapter 2.  However, before moving forward, it is important that I 
make clear how this formulation falls out of the Coextensionality Thesis. For in the 
following chapters, I will just assume that the connection is apparent. 
 As you remember, the Coextensionality Thesis is the claim that the concepts 
good thing, desirable thing, perfect thing, actualized thing, and being are 
coextensive.  Their extension is taken to be precisely the same and it includes both 
the substances and the non-essential concrete attributes of particular things.  
Further, in light of the teleology inherent in the view, it should also be clear that 
the non-essential concrete attributes of a thing that these concepts share in 
extension include those relevant to making the substance an actualized or perfect 
member of its kind. From these features of the view, it should be clear that the 
formulation, ‘a thing, x, is good insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind’ falls out 
of the thesis. 
 That said, why prefer it to other equally valid formulations, such as the 
formulation that a thing is good insofar as it is an actualized thing of its kind?  Of 
the concepts, appetibile thing, perfect thing, actualized thing, and being, only perfect 
thing and actualized thing seem to be desirable options.  For being is an extremely 
obscure term and is liable to cause confusion; also, it is not particularly informative 
when taken in itself.  Appetibile thing is a poor candidate because I take it to be 
related to the concept of good thing and not the nature of a good thing.  And, if it is 
not already clear, in this project I am interested in the metaphysics of goodness.  I 
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have chosen to emphasize the perfect thing formulation rather than the actualized 
thing formulation for two main reasons.  First, like ‘being,’ ‘actuality,’ ‘actualized,’ 
and ‘being actual’ are terms that lend themselves to misunderstandings, even 
though they are rather informative for those who understand them.  Second, 
contemporary views similar to the one that I am defending utilize the perfect thing 
formulation.  So, rather than advancing a different construction that is virtually the 
same in meaning, I decided that it would be preferable to accept the formulation 
that a thing is good insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind. 
 And so I have briefly noted how the perfect thing formulation falls out of the 
Coextentionality Thesis and given a rationale for preferring it to other equally 
legitimate formulations, which also follow from the Coextensionality Thesis. 
Conclusion 
 As I noted at the outset, the present chapter has two main and rather modest 
goals: (1) to make this metaethical thesis comprehensible and (2) to make this 
metaethical thesis plausible. I strove to meet them by, first, describing the reference 
of the concepts being and good thing in the context of the thesis; expositing 
Aquinas’s central argument in support of the thesis; and considering objections 
related to its being a form of synthetic reductionism and the universal teleology that 
seems to be required by the view.  And, in an effort to clarify the connection 
between the metaethical thesis that the concepts being and good are the same in 
reference and differ only in content and the project moving forward, I explained how 
the perfect thing formulation falls out of this Coextensionality Thesis.  And so it is to 
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the work of demonstrating the force of that formulation in the context of substances 
that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Being a good x 
 
Introduction 
Consider steak knives, oak trees, and human beings.  At least in ordinary 
English usage, a particular steak knife, or oak tree, or human may be called ‘good.’  
Of course, any particular ascription of goodness to a knife or a tree or a human may 
be contested.  And, indeed, we would almost certainly say that it is possible to be 
mistaken in calling a knife, a tree, or a man ‘good.’ For example, as I know little 
about steak knives, a cunning knife salesman might convince me that a particular 
steak knife is a good knife even when it is in fact a bad knife and, having been 
thoroughly flummoxed, I may utter the false proposition, “This steak knife is good.” 
All of this leads to a fundamental, but deeply perplexing question: assuming, as we 
clearly do in ordinary language usage, that evaluative facts of the form, “this x is a 
good x,” obtain and so are capable of being true or false, in virtue of what are they 
true or false?53 
 This chapter is an attempt to answer this metaethical question by appealing 
to the Coextensionality Thesis – that is, the medieval thesis that the concepts being 
and good thing (as well as appetibile thing, perfect thing, and actualized thing) are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Of	  course,	  some	  would	  challenge	  this	  assumption	  and	  argue	  that	  ordinary	  usage	  is	  confused.	  There	  are	  no	  objective	  evaluative	  facts,	  they	  would	  claim,	  and	  so	  ascriptions	  of	  good	  and	  bad	  are	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  can	  be	  true	  or	  false;	  they	  either	  express	  how	  one	  feels	  about	  a	  certain	  thing	  (emotivism),	  or	  they	  express	  how	  one	  believes	  everyone	  ought	  to	  feel	  about	  a	  certain	  thing	  (prescriptivism).	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the same in reference and differ only in conceptual contents.54  Over the course of 
this chapter, I will attempt to show that the perfect thing formulation of the 
Coextensionality Thesis is capable of providing a compelling explanation concerning 
what underlies a true ascription of the form “this x is a good x,” where x is a 
substance (such as a watch, a hibiscus, or a human being). In so doing, I will 
proceed in two sections.  First, I will apply the perfect thing formulation to cases 
involving plants, non-human animals, human beings, inanimate, non-artificial 
objects, and, finally, artificial objects; I hope to show that in all these cases this 
formulation provides a compelling explanation as to what underlies the truth or 
falsity of claims about their being good. Then, in Section 2, I will respond to three 
objections to my account.  
 It is important to note at the outset not only what will be addressed in this 
chapter, but also what will be left aside, at least for the time being.  For some will 
undoubtedly be wondering how the rather specific question that I am asking is 
relevant to other seemingly more pressing questions in normative ethics and 
metaethics, such as, “What is welfare? What makes an action good or bad? What 
motivational force does morality have?  How ought we reason practically?  Etc.”  I 
believe that the present inquiry is connected to these questions in important ways, 
but I cannot defend this conviction adequately in the context of this chapter.  So for 
now I will leave it aside.  But it may be of some consolation to know that in Chapter 
3 I will address goodness in action in the context of the Thesis and in relation to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  not	  concern	  myself	  with	  rightness	  and	  wrongness.	  	  My	  focus	  will	  be	  entirely	  on	  the	  case	  of	  goodness	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  on	  the	  case	  of	  the	  goodness	  of	  particular	  subjects.	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perfect thing account I am offering in the present chapter.  It may also be comforting 
to know that the present chapter deals somewhat with the relation between welfare 
and being a good human being.  It seems clear to me that much of interest could be 
written about these related questions.  So I certainly acknowledge that there are 
questions worthy of serious study other than those with which I deal in this 
chapter.  And I further acknowledge that the view that I am defending here may 
force one into or out of particular positions in regards to these other pressing 
questions.  That said, let us turn to the question at hand. 
§1: A good x, where x is a substance 
 “That is a good man.”  “This is a good tomato plant.”  “That is a good 
squirrel.”  What makes ordinary statements like these true or false?  It seems like 
human beings, tomato plants, and squirrels are so different from one another that 
no single account of what it is to be good will suffice.  Despite this apparent 
difficulty, in this section, I will advance a single account that can explain what 
underlies the truth or falsity of a claim about the goodness of a particular thing 
when that thing is (1) a plant, (2) a non-human animal, (3) a human being, (4) an 
inanimate, non-artificial object, or (5) an artificial object.  The basis of this account 
will be the perfect thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis, which I 
discussed near the close of the previous chapter. That formulation states that a 
thing, x, is a good thing insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind.  In this context, 
a thing is considered a perfect member of its kind to the extent to which it has the 
non-essential concrete attributes that are characteristically required for things of 
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its kind to attain their ends.  The essential attributes of a thing – that is, those 
attributes that a thing has just in virtue of being a thing of a particular kind – are 
far less important to an assessment of a thing’s perfection.  This is so because what 
it is to be a perfect x is to have those attributes that are characteristically required 
to attain the ends of x’s and, unless a thing characteristically attains its ends just in 
virtue of being a thing of its kind, that in virtue of which a thing characteristically 
attains its ends will be non-essential concrete attributes.  So what it is to be perfect 
is to be well positioned to attain ends and a thing is generally well positioned to 
attain its ends because it has the non-essential concrete attributes that are 
characteristically required to attain those ends.  Thus, generally, a thing is perfect 
because it has the right sorts of non-essential concrete attributes.  With this 
formulation and framework in mind, let us turn to the five cases mentioned above.   
§1.1: A good tomato plant: the case of plants 
 The topic of goodness in non-human living organisms like plants has recently 
been taken up by philosophers such as Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot.  Foot 
wrote a short, but intriguing book entitled, Natural Goodness. In that work, she 
describes what she calls, natural goodness, which is a kind of goodness “attributable 
only to living things themselves and to their parts, characteristics, and operations, 
[and] is intrinsic or ‘autonomous’ goodness in that it depends directly on the relation 
of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species.”55  As I noted in the previous chapter, 
her view is similar to the one entailed by the Coextensionality Thesis, at least as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Foot,	  Natural	  Goodness,	  26-­‐27.	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Aquinas understood it.  For she believes that particular members of a species are 
good to the degree to which they are perfect (or non-defective) members of their 
species.  Thus, for Foot as well as for Aquinas, an assessment of a living thing’s 
goodness depends upon an understanding of the end(s) of a given creature – what 
the creature is supposed to do or achieve – and an understanding of the 
characteristic ways in which the end(s) are achieved by members of the species.56 
 In the case of a tomato plant (as is the case with plant life in general), the 
chief ends seem to be self-maintenance and reproduction.  All the parts, 
characteristics, and operations of a tomato plant can be explained with reference to 
these two processes.  A tomato plant is thus good to the extent to which it has the 
non-essential concrete attributes appropriate to a tomato plant, in virtue of which 
the tomato plant will at least characteristically attain the ends of self-maintenance 
and reproduction; by ‘non-essential concrete attributes’ I mean those concrete 
attributes that a thing need not have in order to be a member of its kind, but that 
may inhere in the substance nonetheless.  Insofar as the plant lacks the appropriate 
non-essential concrete attributes (e.g. a strong root system or healthy leaves), it is a 
bad tomato plant.  For a particular tomato plant, x, is a good tomato plant insofar 
as it is a perfect member of its kind.  And it is a perfect member of its kind insofar 
as it has the attributes that characteristically allow tomato plants to attain their 
ends.57  So it is in virtue of having the attributes that characteristically allow a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  For	  more	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  Foot,	  see	  Natural	  Goodness,	  33-­‐34.	  57	  One	  might	  worry	  that,	  because	  plant	  species	  are	  susceptible	  to	  change,	  the	  attributes	  that	  a	  particular	  sort	  of	  plant	  has	  to	  have	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  ends	  will	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  fixed	  to	  ground	  claims	  about	  being	  good.	  	  I	  take	  it	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  worry	  has	  already	  been	  addressed	  in	  my	  discussion	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  on	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tomato plant to attain its end that a particular tomato plant is good (not in virtue of 
having attained those ends).58 
§1.2: A good rusty red fox squirrel: the case of non-human animals 
 As with the case of tomato plants, a rusty red fox squirrel is good insofar as it 
is a perfect member of its species.  An assessment of its perfection is dependent 
upon an understanding of its ends – self-maintenance and reproduction59 – as well 
as the characteristic ways in which rusty red fox squirrels attain those ends.  So, for 
example, a rusty red fox squirrel that is a poor climber is, at least in that respect, a 
bad squirrel because rusty red fox squirrels characteristically escape and avoid 
danger by way of climbing and nesting in trees.  A rusty red fox squirrel with the 
non-essential concrete attributes appropriate to it, or without relevant defect – as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  natural	  kinds.	  	  However,	  it	  may	  bear	  repeating	  here.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  debate	  on	  the	  issue,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  still	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  some	  account	  of	  plant	  life	  on	  which	  species	  are	  genuine	  natural	  kinds	  is	  possible;	  such	  an	  account	  will	  have	  to,	  among	  other	  things,	  explain	  at	  what	  point	  local	  adaption	  becomes	  a	  genuine	  change	  in	  species.	  	  For	  now,	  we	  should	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  debate	  concerning	  natural	  kinds	  will	  figure	  prominently	  in	  future	  discussions	  regarding	  views	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  Foot	  and	  Aquinas	  have	  defended.	  But	  let	  us	  leave	  aside	  the	  controversial	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  plant	  species	  should	  be	  considered	  natural	  kinds,	  for	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  consider	  plant	  species	  robust	  natural	  kinds	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  proposal	  of	  this	  kind	  operable.	  Indeed,	  even	  if	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  only	  concrete	  similarities	  between	  plants	  and	  their	  progeny	  and,	  properly	  speaking,	  each	  individual	  plant	  is	  a	  unique	  species,	  the	  proposal	  may	  still	  go	  forward.	  	  For	  concrete	  resemblance	  between	  large	  numbers	  of	  plants	  (say,	  all	  heirloom	  tomato	  plants)	  and	  the	  general	  stability	  of	  properties	  between	  generations	  of	  plants	  are	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  shared	  end(s)	  of	  such	  plants	  and	  of	  the	  parts,	  characteristics,	  and	  operations	  whereby	  they	  attain	  their	  ends.	  	  Even	  if	  “tomato”	  is	  just	  an	  elaborate	  conventional	  kind	  (that	  is,	  a	  kind	  constructed	  by	  human	  convention,	  rather	  than	  given	  by	  nature),	  instances	  of	  tomato	  plants	  may	  be	  sufficiently	  similar,	  and	  tomato	  progeny	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  tomato	  “parents”	  to	  allow	  this	  conventional	  kind	  to	  function	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  pseudo-­‐natural	  norm.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  we	  can	  understand	  both	  the	  ends	  of	  these	  plants	  that	  resemble	  each	  other	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  characteristically	  attain	  those	  ends,	  then	  we	  can	  evaluate	  the	  goodness	  of	  individual	  plants	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  understanding.	  	  58	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  offered	  a	  brief	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  	  But	  I	  will	  also	  offer	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  in	  the	  objections	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  as	  I	  take	  it	  that	  many	  will	  find	  it	  strange	  to	  think	  that	  a	  thing	  is	  good	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  certain	  attributes	  rather	  than	  in	  virtue	  of	  attaining	  ends.	  59	  Perhaps	  rusty	  red	  fox	  squirrels	  have	  other	  ends	  as	  well,	  but	  these	  two	  seem	  to	  be	  excellent	  candidates	  because	  it	  seems	  that	  all	  ordinary	  squirrel	  behavior	  could	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  one	  of	  these	  two	  ends.	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established by an understanding of the ends and characteristic activities of the 
species, rusty red fox squirrel – is a perfect member of its kind and so is a good rusty 
red fox squirrel.  And, as in the case of plants, it is in virtue of having the attributes 
that characteristically allow a rusty red fox squirrel to attain its end that a 
particular rusty red fox squirrel is good, not in virtue of having attained those ends. 
 One might object to this account of what it is to be a good non-human animal 
by noting that very many creatures lack one of the attributes that makes a rusty 
red fox squirrel good, namely the ability to climb trees.  For example, dogs can’t 
climb trees. If rusty red fox squirrels are bad when they lack that ability, shouldn’t 
all dogs be considered bad, at least in a sense, because they lack that ability 
altogether? 
 Aquinas answers this sort of objection by distinguishing between two ways in 
which a thing may lack a certain attribute.  A thing may lack an attribute that it 
ought to have, given its nature, “as, for instance, the privation of sight” in a cat.60  
Or, a thing may lack an attribute that does not belong to its nature.  “For instance, 
a man…who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion.”61  To lack 
what is not appropriate to one is not a defect.  It is a defect only if one lacks what 
one ought to have, given one’s nature as a member of one’s species. 
 One might also object to the account by drawing our attention to a case in 
which a thing lacks some non-essential concrete attribute appropriate to being a 
thing of its kind, but lacking that attribute does not detract from its ability to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  ST	  1a	  Q.48,	  a3c.	  61	  ST	  1a	  Q.48,	  a3c.	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perform its characteristic activities.  For example, a rusty red fox squirrel may be 
born with a patch of black fur upon its back.  In this case, it seems that we must say 
that the squirrel should be considered bad because it has a defect (that is, it lacks a 
non-essential concrete attribute (rusty redness), which most members of its species 
possess). 
 This objection fails to distinguish between the attributes of a thing that “play 
a part in the life of a living thing” and those that don’t.62  But what counts as an 
attribute that “plays a part?”  As Aquinas argued and as Foot reminds us, the 
attributes that play a part in the life of a living thing are those that are 
characteristically appropriate to its attaining its ends.  In the case of the black 
backed, rusty red fox squirrel, assuming that the red coloration is not 
characteristically required for it to attain the ends of self-maintenance and 
reproduction, this purported defect is not a genuine defect.  And so this purported 
defect does not make the squirrel bad.  However, in another creature, say a male 
peacock, the wrong sort of coloration may interfere with the attainment of the end 
of reproduction.  So, in a male peacock, coloration plays a part in its life, for a male 
peacock is colored in a particular way in order to attract a female and so to attain 
one of its ends.  Thus, it is apparent that it is not the type of attribute (e.g. a color) 
considered in itself which decides the question, “does this attribute play a part in 
this creature’s life?”  Rather, one must understand the ends of a given creature and 
the characteristic ways in which those ends are attained in order to determine 
whether or not a particular non-essential concrete attribute plays a part in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  The	  distinction	  is	  Foot’s.	  	  See,	  Natural	  Goodness,	  30-­‐31.	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creature’s life and, concomitantly, whether the attribute represents a genuine defect 
when absent.  Whether or not a particular attribute is a genuine defect will then, of 
course, affect our assessment as to whether this x is a good x. 
§1.3: A good man: the case of human beings 
 Having considered the relatively clear cases of good plants and good non-
human animals, let us consider the more involved and important case of being a 
good human being.  My procedure in the previous two sections was to suggest that 
there are recognizable ends that all creatures of a particular kind share and then to 
note a set of non-essential concrete attributes that may be considered vital for the 
attainment of those ends, at least if the ends are to be attained in the ways 
characteristic of the species. This procedure will undoubtedly seem inadequate for 
the case of human beings.  Debates are ongoing about whether there even is such a 
thing as a human end (or a set of human ends) and, even among those who would 
accept that there is such an end (or ends), there is vigorous debate about what that 
end is (or what those ends are).  I will not pretend to settle these debates here.   
 For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient that we create a formal 
account of what constitutes goodness in human beings and leave the work of filling 
it out largely undone.  For my concern is not to provide an exhaustive list of the 
non-essential concrete attributes that a particular thing must have in order to be 
considered a perfect member of its kind, but rather to suggest the structure that 
any well-formed attempt at providing such an account should follow.  In keeping 
with the classical tradition, let us call the attainment of the human end – whatever 
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it is – ‘eudaimonia.’  I use the term solely as a placeholder that is intended to convey 
the notion of “the attainment of the human end” whatever that end may in fact be.  
So perhaps eudaimonia is experiencing great pleasure, or psychological harmony, or 
becoming a rock star, etc.  A human being would then be good to the extent to which 
he or she has the non-essential concrete attributes that characteristically lead to 
eudaimonia.  These attributes have often been referred to as ‘virtues.’ Of course, if 
we are to use this term, we must remember that this account is entirely formal and 
that the term, ‘virtue,’ is also merely a placeholder that means, “a non-essential 
concrete attribute that characteristically leads to the attainment of the human end.”  
So maybe being tall is a virtue, or being temperate, or being prone to tell white lies.  
Therefore, according to an account of this kind, a human being is good to the extent 
to which he or she has the virtues appropriate to a human being – that is, insofar as 
he or she has the non-essential concrete attributes that characteristically lead to 
eudaimonia, or the attainment of the human end (whatever that end is).63  
 Some might object to the idea that this account can be applied to human 
beings as follows: even if this account of goodness works in the case of a maple tree 
or a cricket, it clearly does not work in the case of a human being. This is so because 
humans differ fundamentally from plants and non-human animals.  We are rational 
beings in a way that they are not.  And because we are rational, we choose our ends.  
Perhaps plants and other animals are, in a sense, given ends as members of their 
species, but such ends are certainly not given to us.  Because of this, there is no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Some	  contemporary	  philosophers	  have	  also	  argued	  for	  this	  sort	  of	  view	  of	  human	  goodness.	  Rosalind	  Hursthouse’s	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  such	  an	  approach.	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matter of fact about which attributes human beings ought to have in order to attain 
their ends. Therefore, this account of goodness should not be considered applicable 
to human beings. 
 This objection brings out an obvious, but important point: human beings are 
far more complex than non-human animals and any satisfactory account of 
goodness will make room for this fact.  I certainly agree with this sentiment.  
However, I disagree with the central thrust of the objection.  That is, I disagree with 
the assertion that we must think of human beings as choosing the ends that are 
relevant to this thesis.  I am certainly not denying that human beings do, in fact, 
choose certain ends, if by ‘ends’ we mean fixed goals or purposes towards which we 
aim in action. What I am denying, or at least challenging, is the notion underlying 
the objection that human beings can choose their final ends; that is, that they can 
choose the ends that they have as members of the species Homo sapiens.  Of course, 
arguing that human beings do in fact have such final ends would take us far afield.  
Thus my extremely modest aim in this paragraph is only to help us see that one 
might acknowledge that human beings choose ends of many kinds, but that it is 
possible that they also have ends that are independent of their choices.  For 
instance, if God exists and our final end as human beings is friendship with God, 
then we have that end independently of our choosing to have it. 
 Even if we believe that the view that human beings have a final end or set of 
final ends is plausible, some may say that this account is so formal that it tells us 
almost nothing about what human goodness actually consists in.  For, indeed, I 
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have said nothing concrete about what the human final end might be nor have I laid 
out a set of human virtues.  
 Of course it is true that the account that I have offered is formal.  But two 
points are worthy of note.  First, it should be noted that even in the realm of ethics 
this account does some work.  More particularly, it describes the structure that a 
rightly formed account of being a good human will take.  So it eliminates some 
possible accounts of human goodness – e.g. an account on which the non-essential 
concrete attributes of the agent were left unconsidered in an assessment of his or 
her goodness.  Second, it is important to mention that this formal account is very 
close to being a substantive account.  All that one would need do to change this 
formal account into a substantive account would be to insert a clear view about the 
final end or ends of human life.  Many people already have views about this issue.  
For them, the formal account can be filled out quite naturally and powerfully.  For 
example, a Kantian may say that the end of human beings is to be a certain kind of 
rational agent.  If that were so, then virtues such as understanding and insight as 
well as virtues that limit the interference of reason by what are often called ‘the 
passions’ would be central to human goodness. 
 Let us consider one more objection before moving on to the case of rocks.  One 
might object by pointing out that we usually think of the goodness of human beings 
solely in terms of their moral goodness.  This account seems to force us to say that 
people with certain non-moral defects are worse than people without such defects.  
But that is absurd.  A blind person isn’t bad because she is blind, nor is a sighted 
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person good because she can see.  An assessment of a human agent’s goodness 
should be based solely upon the moral uprightness of the agent and any account 
that denies this should be rejected. 
 As the objector makes clear, we must distinguish between two types of 
goodness in human beings – moral goodness and non-moral goodness.  Moral 
goodness is the kind of goodness associated with character traits like generosity, 
courage, and temperance whereas non-moral goodness is the goodness associated 
with physical traits like healthy eyes.  When we hear the phrase ‘good woman’ or 
‘good man,’ we immediately think of a morally good woman or a morally good man.  
This is so because, generally, we think that moral goodness is far more relevant to 
an assessment of the goodness of persons than non-moral goodness.  This, it seems, 
may be good evidence to suggest that we take the final end of human beings to be 
more closely related to moral goodness than non-moral goodness.  But if it were the 
case that the final end of human beings was characteristically achieved in virtue of 
a set of physical attributes, then, according to this account, certain physical 
attributes would be considered among the virtues.  So, for example, if pleasure were 
the final end of human beings, and human beings characteristically attained 
pleasure through some activity that blind people could not participate in, then blind 
people would be considered less good than their sighted counterparts, at least in 
that respect.   
 So it is true that, if physical attributes were important virtues, or non-
essential attributes that characteristically allowed human beings to attain their 
	   55	  
ends, we would be forced to conclude that, e.g. the blind are less good in a certain 
respect than the sighted.  But in some sense, we may think that it is clear that 
sighted people are better off than their blind peers – better off with respect to sight.  
So it may not seem strange to say that a sighted person is better than a blind 
person, all else being equal.  Of course, the blind are not in any sense culpable for 
being blind, assuming they were not made blind by their own intentional act.  Nor 
are the blind barred from the attainment of the human end, given the rather 
mundane assumption that sight is not essential to attaining the human end.  So it 
seems that nothing particularly disturbing follows from the notion that non-moral, 
non-essential concrete attributes may be relevant to an assessment of human 
goodness, broadly construed.  
 But there is more to be said.  For here it is also important to note that the 
Coextensionality Thesis, at least as Aquinas understood it, rests upon a distinction 
between two sorts of goodness onto which the non-moral-moral distinction maps 
quite nicely – the distinction between substantial goodness and accidental goodness.  
Both in the previous chapter and in the current chapter, I have made reference to 
the grounding of this basic distinction by noting that there are non-essential 
concrete attributes of substances and there are substances, which considered in 
themselves include only essential concrete attributes (including the capacities to do 
certain things). 
   As one might expect, the attributes that are substantially good are those 
that a thing has simply in virtue of being a substance of its kind.  In the human 
	   56	  
case, this would include the capacities for sight, movement, reason, et cetera.64  The 
attributes that are accidentally good are those that a thing does not have simply in 
virtue of being a thing of its kind, but – given a thing’s nature – they are attributes 
that a thing may gain or lose while remaining a thing of its kind; these are the non-
essential concrete attributes of substances I have spoken of in this and the previous 
chapter.  In the human case, this would include moral and intellectual virtues.  
Aquinas believes that “good is spoken of as more or less according to a thing’s 
superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.””65  That is, Aquinas 
believes that that in virtue of which a substance is, all things considered, a good 
thing is primarily connected to accidental goodness.  In the human case, it seems 
clear that the most important such attributes are those related to moral goodness, 
rather than non-moral goodness.  And it seems equally clear that moral goodness is 
almost entirely unrelated to substantial goodness.  Thus, it seems that, given 
Aquinas’s views surrounding the Coextensionality Thesis, one has principled 
grounds on which to elevate moral goodness far above non-moral goodness in the 
assessment of goodness in human beings.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  If	  you	  lack	  one	  of	  these	  capacities,	  Aquinas	  attributes	  the	  lack	  to	  a	  corruption	  of	  matter,	  rather	  than	  a	  corruption	  of	  form.	  	  So	  being	  blind,	  for	  instance,	  results	  from	  a	  corruption	  of	  matter	  and	  not	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  less	  than	  human	  substantial	  form.	  	  ST	  1a2ae	  Q85	  a6c:	  “Consequently	  as	  regards	  his	  form,	  incorruption	  is	  more	  natural	  to	  man	  than	  to	  other	  corruptible	  things.	  But	  since	  that	  very	  form	  has	  a	  matter	  composed	  of	  contraries,	  from	  the	  inclination	  of	  that	  matter	  there	  results	  corruptibility	  in	  the	  whole.	  In	  this	  respect	  man	  is	  naturally	  corruptible	  as	  regards	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  matter	  left	  to	  itself,	  but	  not	  as	  regards	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  form.”	  65	  ST	  1a	  Q.5	  a1	  ad3.	  66	  Perhaps	  more	  interesting	  than	  the	  case	  of	  physical	  blindness	  is	  its	  analogue	  with	  respect	  to	  intelligence	  –	  namely,	  ignorance.	  	  It	  does	  seem	  that	  certain	  sorts	  of	  knowledge	  may	  be	  among	  the	  non-­‐essential	  concrete	  attributes	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  human	  being.	  	  For	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  reason	  is	  a	  specifying	  capacity	  and	  is	  thus	  integral	  to	  the	  human	  good.	  	  Of	  course,	  such	  a	  view	  goes	  well	  with	  Aquinas’s	  overall	  intellectualism	  about	  morality:	  that	  wrongdoing	  can	  often	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ignorance.	  	  So	  in	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§1.4: A good piece of granite: the case of inanimate, non-artificial things 
 Thus far, I have moved from objects that are relatively simple cases of 
goodness to cases that are increasingly complex – from tomato plants and squirrels 
to human beings.  It may initially seem strange to think that the goodness of a rock 
may be harder to make sense of than that of a human being.  But a moment’s 
reflection makes it clear that it seems odd to label something like a piece of granite 
‘good’ when you consider it in itself whereas it does not seem strange to call a man 
like Ghandi ‘good.’  The reason that it seems odd will be brought out as we consider 
the application of the perfect thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis to 
inanimate, non-artificial things, like a piece of granite.   
 Let us begin with the now common construction: a piece of granite is good 
insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind.  When expanded, this means that a 
piece of granite is good insofar as it has the attributes that granite 
characteristically has if it is to attain its end(s).  But here it will be pointed out that 
granite doesn’t seem to have an end.  Indeed, what could it possibly mean to say 
that a piece of granite has an end, when considered in itself?  And then a further 
question comes to the fore: even if there were such an end, doesn’t one piece of 
granite always have exactly the same attributes, generally speaking, as any other 
piece of granite (assuming that they are both pure pieces of granite of the same 
kind)?  And if that is so, then it seems that rocks only have substantial goodness 
because all of their concrete attributes are essential to them.  So all this talk about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  case	  of	  human	  reason,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that,	  according	  to	  a	  view	  of	  the	  sort	  Aquinas	  embraces,	  sufficiently	  serious	  intellectual	  failings	  are	  bad-­‐making,	  just	  as	  moral	  failings	  are	  bad-­‐making.	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granite being good insofar as it has the attributes that granite characteristically has 
if it is to attain its end(s) is absurd. 
 In understanding what makes a piece of granite good on this account, we 
must remember that all things that tend toward something have appetites or 
desires in the relevant sense.  And all the appetites and desires of a thing can 
ultimately be traced to some final end or ends.  Because granite is, relatively 
speaking, a very simple thing we would not expect it to have many appetites even in 
this broad sense of appetite.  However, it does seem to have at least one such 
appetite or tendency – namely, the tendency to remain a piece of rock of a certain 
kind.  So, if the final end of a piece of granite is simply to remain a piece of granite, 
then a piece of granite is good insofar as it has the attributes characteristic of 
granite.  And, of course, a piece of granite will always have all of the characteristics 
of granite – if it lacked any of the genuine characteristics of granite, it would no 
longer be granite. So each and every piece of granite, as well as each and every 
inanimate, non-artificial thing considered in itself, is a perfect member of its kind 
and so is good.   
 If it turns out that all rocks are good, we would surely need to explain why it 
sounds strange to call a rock, considered in itself, ‘good.’  Well, if it is true that all 
rocks are good, it seems that it might sound strange to call a rock ‘good’ because we 
generally call things ‘good’ only when there are also bad members of the same kind 
– that is, members of a kind that do not have the accidental goodness appropriate to 
them; in other words, members that lack the non-essential concrete attributes that 
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characteristically allow them to achieve their ends.  For example, we call some 
tomato plants ‘good’ because they are healthy (i.e. have the non-essential concrete 
attributes characteristically required for attaining their ends) and others ‘bad’ 
because they lack some of the non-essential concrete attributes of tomato plants 
that characteristically allow them to attain their ends (e.g. healthy leaves). But, let 
us imagine a world in which all tomato plants were precisely the same and they all 
were equally healthy and so equally proficient producers of fruit.  If this were so, it 
might seem strange to hear someone say, “I have a good tomato plant,” even if it 
were true, because we generally don’t call a particular thing ‘good’ if all members of 
a kind have precisely the same non-essential concrete attributes. If this view were 
correct, then rocks would be similar to the case of the otherworldly tomato plants 
because there are no rocks that are bad members of their kinds.  That is, there are 
no rocks that lack non-essential concrete attributes in virtue of which they could be 
thought to have accidental goodness.  This is so because rocks only have substantial 
goodness.  In other words, there are no non-essential concrete attributes that a 
piece of granite needs in order to attain its end and so granite has no accidental 
goodness.  Thus, all pieces of granite are good to the same degree.  If this is all 
correct, then this explains why the claim, “This is a good rock,” sounds strange.67 
 In response to this account, someone may point out that, despite my claim to 
the contrary, we do in fact say that some rocks are ‘good’ and that others are ‘bad.’  
Take marble, for instance. Good marble is that which is capable of being used in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  This,	  again,	  relies	  upon	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  substance	  is	  good	  in	  a	  certain	  respect	  because	  of	  its	  essential	  attributes,	  but	  it	  is	  good	  considered	  absolutely	  when	  it	  has	  all	  of	  the	  non-­‐essential	  concrete	  attributes	  that	  are	  characteristically	  required	  for	  a	  thing	  of	  its	  kind	  to	  attain	  its	  end(s).	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construction projects or by sculptors, whereas bad marble has defects that make it 
unusable. 
 Here we must make a distinction between what is good considered in itself 
and what is good for something further.  The cases that we have been considering 
have all been cases in which we are concerned with what is good considered in itself.  
In other words, we have been concerned with what it is to be a good substance.  Of 
course, we also believe that things can be good for something further.  That is, we 
think that some things are useful or appropriate for achieving some further aim.  
Thus, marble can be considered good for a construction project or good for a 
sculpture, but then we have entered into a use of the term ‘good’ other than the one 
on which we are focusing for the purposes of this chapter.  So, although it is true 
that we may say that a particular piece of marble is a good piece or a bad piece, 
with some further project in mind, if the marble is considered in itself, all marble 
may still be considered equally good because each piece is a perfect member of its 
kind. In other words, each piece has all the substantial goodness appropriate to it 
just in virtue of being a piece of its kind; rocks have no accidental goodness because 
there are no non-essential concrete attributes that rocks characteristically requires 
to achieve their end; and so each piece of rock is an equally good member of its kind. 
 Now, someone might then say, we call a particular piece of marble ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ after it has been made into a sculpture and at that point we call it ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ considered in itself.  Indeed, this is so.  But then we are no longer considering 
the marble as marble, but rather as a human creation that employs marble.  And 
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this brings us to the final class of things that we will consider – artifacts, or objects 
made by human beings. 
§1.5: A good straw: the case of artifacts  
 As you might now expect, on the account of goodness we’re considering, an 
artifact is considered good insofar as it is a perfect member of its kind.  Thus, for 
example, a straw is good insofar as it is a perfect straw.  ‘Perfection’ in this context 
refers to having the non-essential concrete attributes appropriate to doing the 
function of a straw well.  So a straw is good insofar as it has the attributes that 
allow it to be used by a human being to readily suck a liquid into his or her mouth.  
Thus, a straw that cannot preserve a vacuum due to, e.g., a punctured tube is a bad 
straw (at least in that respect) because it has a defect that renders the straw less 
able to fulfill its function.  A straw without relevant defect is a perfect straw and, 
thus, it is a good straw. 
 Some may object to this analysis by pointing out that the project rests upon 
the Coextensionality Thesis and according to that thesis a thing is good insofar as it 
is a being, where ‘being’ refers to a substance.  A straw does not seem to be a 
substance in the relevant sense because it seems to be an artificial and thus 
composite creation.  Therefore, the Coextensionality Thesis does not apply to 
artifacts because they are not genuine substances. 
 One may respond to this sort of objection in one of three ways.  (1) One may 
accept the premises and so accept the conclusion that the Coextensionality Thesis 
does not apply to artifacts because artifacts are not genuine substances. Or (2) one 
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may argue that, although artifacts are not genuine substances, they have features 
that make them an analogous case to the case of genuine substances and so the 
thesis may be applied to them in some analogous way. Or, finally, (3) one may argue 
that artifacts are genuine substances on par with granite and human beings.   All of 
these approaches seem defensible, on their face, and so I will consider how one 
might proceed in light of each of them.  
 If one accepts the first of these options, then the Coextensionality Thesis will 
contribute little to an account of what it is to be a good artifact.  Presumably there 
will be another story to be told. 
 If one accepts the second of these options, then one will point out the 
similarities between genuine substances and artifacts.  The most important 
similarities for the purpose of the Coextensionality Thesis will be the end-
directedness of both and the fact that artifacts, like most genuine substances, can 
lack non-essential concrete attributes that are characteristically required in order to 
attain the artifact’s end.  So, for instance, the kind, ‘candle,’ has the end of burning 
consistently so as to produce light.  Candles can lack certain non-essential concrete 
attributes, such as having a wick that draws wax well.  So, like in the case of 
genuine substances, we can judge particular candles (or artifacts in general) on the 
basis of whether or not they have the non-essential concrete attributes that 
characteristically allow them to achieve their end or perform their function well.  
 Finally, if one accepts the third of these options, in applying the thesis, one 
will take an approach that is similar to the second.  However, one will have some 
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work to do in explaining why we ought to regard artifacts as genuine substances 
rather than as a group of substances put together in some way.  In attempting to 
give an explanation, one might appeal to Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of the sort 
defended by Kathrin Koslicki in her book, The Structure of Objects.68  For if one 
could show that artifacts are genuine wholes, it may then seem natural to regard 
them as genuine substances of a kind. 
 But, an adherent of the first approach may object to the second and third 
approaches by pointing out that artifacts can be used for purposes other than those 
for which they were designed.  For example, a shoe can function as a doorstop.  In 
such cases, is a shoe good in virtue of having the characteristics of a perfect 
doorstop or is it only good when it is perfect considered as a shoe?  If a shoe can be 
considered good in virtue of its being a perfect doorstop, then it seems that artifacts 
are not members of kinds in the way required to make the perfect thing formulation 
applicable to artifacts. If a shoe cannot be considered good in virtue of its having the 
attributes characteristic of a perfect doorstop, then it seems that we must somewhat 
arbitrarily assign a function to a thing even when it may be as well suited for 
multiple tasks. 
 It seems to me that, generally speaking, adherents of the second option listed 
above may embrace either of the two horns of this dilemma.  That is, they may say 
(1) that a shoe, when functioning as an excellent doorstop, may be considered good 
in virtue of its functioning as a doorstop.  Of course, the term ‘shoe’ would then not 
designate the kind according to which the object referred to as a ‘shoe’ is being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Kathrin	  Koslicki,	  The	  Structure	  of	  Objects,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008).	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evaluated.  That is, if the object is considered as a doorstop, the kind, ‘shoe,’ is not 
the kind against which the perfection of the object is being considered, but, rather, 
the kind, ‘doorstop’, is applicable.  Or (2), they might say that the nature of the 
thing and so its kind, is fixed in virtue of its initial design.  So, although a shoe may 
function as a doorstop, we ought not evaluate its goodness as a thing in light of its 
value as a doorstop, but rather according to its perfection as a thing of its kind, 
namely, as a shoe.  This is not an arbitrary choice, as the objector suggests.  For 
artifacts are, by their very natures, designed entities and so part of what it is to be 
an artifact is to have a designated function or set of functions, given by the artifact’s 
creator.  Of course, artifacts may be significantly altered (e.g. I may break a leg off 
of a table and use it as a baseball bat), but in that case it seems that the artifact has 
been re-designed (so to speak) and so has taken on a new nature, which will then be 
the nature relevant to an evaluation of the thing.   
 It seems that only this latter approach is available to adherents of the third 
option mentioned above.  For if one believes that artifacts are genuine substances 
because they are structured wholes, then its being structured for a particular 
purpose seems to be a part of what makes the artifact both a whole and a substance. 
§2: Objections 
 The previous section served two primary purposes: (1) to apply the perfect 
thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis to five different types of substances 
(or pseudo-substances, depending upon one’s view); and (2) to respond to case-
specific objections related to each of these five applications.  In this section I will 
	   65	  
briefly consider three further objections that, if sound, would undermine the 
plausibility or attractiveness of the view.  The first concerns the way in which we 
are to understand pain; the second concerns the priority of non-essential concrete 
attributes over ends in determining what counts as a good thing; and the third 
concerns a problem associated with the relation between virtues and ends in the 
human case. 
Objection 1: The problem of pain 
 There are at least some attributes of things that seem to be genuine beings 
(in the broad sense) and yet are intrinsically bad, such as pain.  Given the 
Coextentionality Thesis, this should be impossible.  For a substance is good insofar 
as it has being and pain is being that inheres in a substance.  Thus, the case of pain 
is a counterexample to the Thesis.69  
 What is an adherent of the Coextentionality Thesis to say about pain?  It 
seems that one might say at least three things. 
 First, one might deny that pain is a being at all.  In other words, one could 
argue that pain has no genuine reality, but it is unclear how one could do so in any 
plausible sort of way.  And so I will spend no more time discussing it. 
 Second, one might argue that pain is a being, but that it is not bad.  This sort 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Pain	  has	  long	  been	  used	  as	  a	  counterexample	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  16th	  century,	  Francisco	  Suárez	  considered	  the	  following	  sort	  of	  counterexample	  to	  the	  Coextensionality	  Thesis:	  “pain	  is	  an	  evil	  of	  penalty	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  something	  positive.	  	  Nor	  could	  it	  be	  said	  that	  pain	  is	  evil	  because	  it	  prevents	  the	  opposite	  pleasure;	  for,	  although	  the	  privation	  of	  pleasure	  may	  be	  an	  evil,	  nevertheless	  the	  existence	  of	  pain	  is	  a	  much	  greater	  and	  different	  kind	  of	  evil.	  	  Therefore,	  evil	  is	  not	  just	  privation,	  nor	  is	  it	  something	  positive	  only	  by	  reason	  of	  privation,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  itself	  positive.”	  	  Jorge	  Gracia,	  “Evil	  and	  the	  Transcendentality	  of	  Goodness:	  Suárez’s	  Solution	  to	  the	  Problem	  of	  Positive	  Evils,”	  in	  Scott	  MacDonald	  (ed.),	  Being	  and	  Goodness:	  The	  Concept	  
of	  the	  Good	  in	  Metaphysics	  and	  Philosophical	  Theology,	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  155.	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of view might be motivated by noting that pain functions as a kind of warning-
system in the body.  Certainly this function is not bad.  This line of argument seems 
more promising than the first, but, if one were to take this approach, one would 
need to explain why the positive instrumental value of pain (at least in some 
circumstances) makes it any less compelling to believe that pain is instrumentally 
or intrinsically bad at the same time.  For, at the very least, pain can be debilitating 
and so disallow one from doing beneficial activities, which seems to make it obvious 
that pain is at least instrumentally bad (that is, bad because of what follows from 
it). 
 Thirdly, one might argue that pain is a being and that it is bad, but it is only 
instrumentally bad and not intrinsically bad.  In other words, one might accept that 
pain is a being and that it is bad, but argue that it is not bad insofar as it is a being.  
It is bad because of certain relations that it generally bears to other things. This 
sort of response could be seen as an attempt to make the second sort of response 
more plausible. Francisco Suárez took an approach of this kind.  Suárez accepted 
that pain is a being and that it is bad in character, but he attempted to fit pain into 
the Coextensionality Thesis by distinguishing between “evil in itself” and “evil for 
another.”70  On this picture, pain is not evil in itself, but only evil for another – 
namely, the one suffering from it.  This approach is similar in certain respects to 
Richard Kraut’s views on pain as expressed in his essay, “Desire and the Human 
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Good.” 71 In that paper, Kraut argues that pain is not intrinsically bad. 72 He notes, 
“We don’t notice any characteristic of pain that grounds our aversion to it; we just 
hate the way it feels.  But according to my proposal that is not enough to show that 
it really is bad in itself.”73  The badness of pain, on Kraut’s view, is related to: (1) 
the fact that it normally accompanies some physical malady and (2) the fact that it 
distracts us or renders us less able to do as we ought.74  So, in effect, Kraut denies 
that pain is bad in itself and argues that it is instrumentally bad, or bad because of 
what follows from it. A proposal of this kind seems defensible and, because it allows 
us to deny that pain is intrinsically bad, it preserves the Coextensionality Thesis. 
Objection 2: Do attributes or end-attainment make us good? 
 On the view supported by the Coextensionality Thesis, a non-essential 
concrete attribute is good-making because of the relation that it bears to the ends of 
the substance in which it inheres.  In other words, the value of a non-essential 
attribute is derived from the fact that it characteristically allows a thing to attain 
its ends.  Now, that which is valued as a means to an end is of less value than the 
end.  Therefore, end-attainment is more important than having a set of attributes.  
And, thus, a thing ought to be considered good to the extent to which it has attained 
its ends rather than to the extent to which it has the appropriate set of non-
essential concrete attributes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Richard	  Kraut,	  “Desire	  and	  the	  Human	  Good.”	  Presidential	  Address	  at	  the	  92nd	  annual	  central	  division	  meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association,	  1994.	  72	  Kraut,	  46.	  73	  Kraut,	  46.	  74	  Kraut,	  46.	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 An adherent of the Coextensionality Thesis as I have described it must agree 
with most of what the objector has said.  For instance, it does indeed seem like 
attaining an end as a being must be more important than having the appropriate 
attributes, if what makes these attributes important at all is their relation to the 
end.  In responding to this sort of objection, there are at least two possible 
approaches. 
 First, one could argue that there is a far closer relation between attributes 
and end-attainment than the objector supposes.  For the objector seems to assume 
that the non-essential concrete attributes have merely instrumental value in 
helping things attain their ends.  Perhaps, instead, some non-essential concrete 
attributes are partially constitutive of end-attainment; let’s call these non-essential 
concrete attributes ‘ingredients,’ for the sake of simplicity.  So, in other words, 
perhaps ingredients have final value – i.e. value as ends – because they partially 
constitute end-attainment.75 To bring this proposal into focus, consider the following 
analogy.  
 In order to make a good pie, one requires a set of ingredients that will be 
partially constitutive of the pie itself (e.g. flour, sugar, et cetera).  For ease of 
making the pie, one would also be glad to have a mixer, a spoon, and the like.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  As	  many	  see	  intrinsic	  value	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  instrumental	  value,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  briefly	  clarify	  how	  final	  
value	  differs	  from	  intrinsic	  value.	  	  Intrinsic	  value	  is	  the	  value	  that	  something	  has	  in	  itself,	  that	  is,	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  intrinsic,	  nonrelational	  properties.	  	  	  A	  nonrelational	  property	  is	  a	  property	  that	  a	  thing	  has	  independently	  of	  any	  relationships	  that	  it	  has	  with	  other	  things.	  	  	  (For	  example,	  squareness	  is	  a	  nonrelational	  property,	  as	  is	  having	  a	  certain	  mass.	  	  In	  general,	  one	  might	  say	  that	  a	  nonrelational	  property	  is	  a	  property	  that	  something	  might	  have	  even	  if	  it	  existed	  in	  a	  world	  all	  its	  own.)	  Final	  value,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  the	  value	  that	  something	  has	  as	  an	  end.	  	  That	  which	  has	  final	  value	  may	  fall	  in	  the	  category	  of	  intrinsically	  valuable	  things	  (things	  valued	  due	  to	  intrinsic,	  nonrelational	  properties)	  or	  extrinsically	  valuable	  things	  (things	  valued	  for	  relational	  properties).	  Christine	  Korsgaard,	  “Two	  Distinctions	  in	  Goodness”,	  Philosophical	  Review,	  92,	  169-­‐95	  (1983),	  170.	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However, the goods of this second type do not directly add anything to the pie itself 
and so, at least in principle, a pie could be made without them.  Not so with the 
ingredients.  Without at least some recognized set of ingredients, one can no longer 
be said to have a pie at all.  One might say that end-attainment is similar to a 
delicious pie.  The ingredients are like the goods constitutive of the human end, 
which, we might think, includes some virtues. The cooking tools are like the 
instrumental goods that are useful to the attainment of the human end.76 
 The objection rests on the idea that I am treating virtues like cooking tools, 
rather than like ingredients.  That is, it rests on the idea that I am treating virtues 
as valuable only because of what follows from them, rather than as things that are 
valuable in themselves.  If virtues are partially constitutive of the human end, then 
this objection is misguided because the objection rests on the idea that end-
attainment and virtue are genuinely distinct categories. 
 But why think that virtues are valuable in themselves?  W.D. Ross famously 
gave us reason to think as much.  He asked us to imagine two worlds, W1 and W2. 
The worlds are precisely the same, except in one respect - W1 contains virtuous 
agents (who are disposed to act from right motives) and W2 contains vicious agents 
(who are disposed to act from wrong motives). Remember, the worlds are precisely 
the same and so there are equal amounts of pleasure, equal amounts of suffering, 
equal amounts of every sort of valuable thing (except virtue) in the past, present, 
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  As	  with	  any	  analogy,	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  use	  of	  this	  analogy.	  	  The	  analogy	  may	  become	  strained	  if	  you	  consider	  such	  elements	  as	  the	  heating	  of	  the	  pie	  and	  the	  eating	  of	  pie.	  I	  use	  it,	  despite	  its	  weaknesses,	  because	  I	  believe	  it	  demonstrates	  what	  might	  be	  meant	  by	  saying	  that	  a	  relation	  is	  constitutive,	  rather	  than	  instrumental	  and	  how	  this	  might	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  of	  virtues	  and	  the	  human	  end.	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and future of these two worlds. Which world is preferable?  It seems that W1 is 
preferable.  Ross believes that the reason that this is so is that virtue is intrinsically 
good, which for our purposes is more or less equivalent to virtue’s being valuable in 
itself.77 
 There is also a second possible response to this objection: one could reject the 
inference from (a) end-attainment is more important than having a set of attributes 
to (b) a thing ought to be considered good to the extent to which it has attained its 
ends.  The suppressed premise between the two statements seems to be, “A thing 
ought to be considered good to the extent to which it has accomplished or come to 
possess what is most important.”  One might deny this suppressed premise.  Indeed, 
it seems that there is a principled reason to do so.  For there are clearly cases in 
which we think that a thing, x, is good, but that it has failed to attain its ends.  And 
there are clearly cases in which we think that a thing, x, is bad, but that it has 
attained its ends. I will offer one example of each.   
 First, consider the case of Job in the Hebrew Scriptures.  The story goes that 
Job, who is a righteous man, loses all his possessions, his family, and all that he 
has, save three ‘friends’ to harass him and a wife who tells him that it is time to die.  
In the case of this story, it seems right to say that Job is a good man because of his 
righteous character, even after losing everything.  But it certainly doesn’t seem that 
he has attained the human end in his misery.  So, despite the contention of the 
objector, it seems that a thing is not good to the extent to which it has attained his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  W.D.	  Ross,	  The	  Right	  and	  the	  Good,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1930),134.	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end.   
 Let’s consider a second case, the case of the squirrel with a thyroid problem.  
Imagine that, due to a defective thyroid, this squirrel balloons when it eats.  The 
squirrel becomes so fat that it can no longer climb trees.  A zookeeper, seeing the 
plight of this squirrel, has compassion on it, (easily) captures it, and puts it in an 
exhibit at the zoo.  The squirrel is well fed and is given a mate.  Assuming that self-
maintenance and reproduction are the ends of squirrels, it seems that this squirrel 
has attained those ends.  How would we characterize this situation?  It seems that 
we would say that the squirrel is a bad squirrel, but that it has a high level of 
welfare.  That is, we would say that the bad squirrel is faring well.  But, if the 
objection were sound, we should characterize this squirrel as a good squirrel.  
Which leads us to the fundamental mistake I believe the objector to be making. 
 The objection conflates two sorts of goodness: (1) the goodness of a substance 
(whether functionally or morally understood) and (2) the goodness related to 
welfare.  It is true that we use the term ‘good’ to convey a certain quality of life or 
welfare that one enjoys.  So, we might say that Smith’s life is good because he has 
lots of friends, meaningful labor, etc.  However, it seems unlikely that we would say 
that Smith is a good man just in virtue of Smith’s having friends and meaningful 
labor, etc.  The Coextensionality Thesis is concerned with, e.g., what it is for Smith 
to be a good man, rather than what it is for Smith to live a good life.  Of course, 
questions concerning the good life are important and they will almost certainly be 
connected to questions about what it is to be a good human being.  And, indeed, 
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with the objector we might say that living a good life (that is, attaining the human 
end) is more important than being a good human being, at least in certain sense.  
But, again, the Coextensionality Thesis is concerned only with that in virtue of 
which a statement of the form, “This x is a good x,” is true.  Given the case of Job 
and the case of the fat squirrel, it still seems quite right to believe that what it is to 
be a good x (where x is a substance) is related directly to having a set of attributes, 
rather than to end-attainment. 
Objection 3: A problem with human beings: what it is to be good is relative 
 Even if the human ends are in fact fixed ends, the virtues that 
characteristically allow us to attain them are contingent.  For example, if among the 
human ends is having genuine friendships, then the virtues (or non-essential 
concrete attributes) that one characteristically must have in order to have such 
friendships are contingent.  Perhaps in one’s culture one must characteristically be 
jovial and outgoing to make genuine friends and perhaps in another culture one 
must characteristically be somber and introverted.  But if the virtues are 
contingent, then so too is what it is to be a good human being.  So this proposal is 
ultimately relativistic in nature because what it is to be a good human being is 
dependent upon what non-essential concrete attributes, given one’s historical and 
culture situation, are required to attain one’s ends. 
 One could, of course, respond to this objection by saying, “What’s the 
problem?”  What it is to be a good human being just is historically situated because 
which attributes one needs in order to attain certain fixed ends will vary by epoch 
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and situation.  Indeed, some might see this as a positive feature of the account – it 
is adaptable to different contexts.   
 For those who would prefer a more stable account of what it is to be a good 
human being, it seems that one may proceed in two ways. 
 First, one might agree that what counts as a virtue is contingent, but, 
perhaps due to certain facts about human beings, they happen to be very stable.  
This is the sort of approach that Martha Nussbaum defends in her essay, “Non-
relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach.”78  In that work, Nussbaum identifies a 
series of spheres of human experience in which nearly all human beings operate, 
such as the spheres of bodily appetite, social association, and intellectual life.  She 
suggests that there may be a single objective account of the human good, which is 
built off of these stable spheres of experience.79  But she also emphasizes that the 
content of some of the virtues will differ in certain respects depending upon one’s 
context.  In this way, Nussbaum argues, “the Aristotelian virtue-based morality can 
capture a good deal of what the relativist is after, and still make a claim to 
objectivity.”80  In other words, even though the virtues are contingent, both the 
spheres in which virtues operate and the content of those virtues are in fact very 
stable.  So what it is to be a human being is not relative in any objectionable sense. 
 But, if an approach similar to Nussbaum’s is still too unstable for one, it is 
possible to stabilize the account further by accepting special sorts of ends that will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  and	  Amartya	  Sen	  (eds.),	  “Non-­‐Relative	  Virtues:	  an	  Aristotelian	  approach,”	  The	  Quality	  of	  Life,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  79	  Nussbaum,	  660.	  80	  Nussbaum,	  671.	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make it the case that certain virtues (with specific contents) are necessary in all 
cases, if the human end is to be attained.  There are two obvious sorts of ends that 
would make certain virtues necessary to the attainment of the human end: (1) an 
end that is largely constituted by possession of the virtues (understood as having 
specific contents) and (2) a supernatural end, e.g. of the sort accepted by Christians. 
I will consider both sorts briefly in turn. 
 In dealing with the previous objection, I suggested that we might take virtues 
to be partially constitutive of the human end.  From that discussion it should be 
clear that, if one accepts that the human end is largely (or entirely) constituted by 
the possession of particular virtues, then the virtues will not be contingent in the 
sense suggested by the objection.  For, if the final end were constituted by a set of 
virtues, then the very same virtues (understood in the very same way) would have 
to be possessed by any and all persons who attain the final end.  
 Also, if the human end were supernatural, then it would seem plausible to 
think that – as in the case of the end being constituted by particular virtues – a set 
of particular virtues would be required in every case to attain the end.  For if the 
supernatural end is, e.g., friendship with a God of the kind that most Christians 
believe in, then it may be reasonable to believe that friendship with a God – who is 
unchanging – requires a fixed set of virtues.  So perhaps, because of certain facts 
about God, human beings must have the infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity 
in order to enter into this supernatural relationship and so to attain their 
supernatural end.  If that were so, then – of course – the set of virtues would not be 
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contingent in the sense relevant to the objection, for the same virtues would have to 
be possessed by all people in order to attain this supernatural end.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that the perfect thing formulation of the 
Coextensionality Thesis is capable of providing a compelling explanation concerning 
what underlies a true ascription of the form “this x is a good x,” where x is a 
substance (such as a fish, a candle, or a woman).  I argued for this conclusion by 
applying this formulation to distinct sorts of beings (e.g. artifacts, humans, and 
plants) and considering case specific objections.  Then I responded to what I take to 
be three of the more important general challenges to the application of the perfect 
thing formulation. 
 Despite having applied this formulation to human beings and considered 
some objections related to the human case, the implications of the perfect thing 
formulation for how we are to understand the goodness of human beings and human 
actions remains very sketchy.  In the next chapter, it is my goal to bring further 
clarity in this regard by considering the implications of the perfect thing formulation 
for normative ethical theories.  And so it is to that subject that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Being, Good, and Normative Ethics 
 
Introduction 
 In the first chapter, I exposited and defended St. Thomas Aquinas’s 
Coextensionality Thesis according to which the concepts good thing, appetibile 
thing, perfect thing, actualized thing, and being are the same in reference and differ 
only in conceptual contents.  In Chapter 2, I suggested that we might make use of 
the perfect-thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis in understanding what 
underlies true claims of the form, “This x is a good x,” where x is a substance.  In 
that chapter, I briefly dealt with the statement, “This human being is a good human 
being,” but because of the constraints of the chapter I did little beyond sketch an 
extremely formal account of human goodness.   
 In this chapter, I intend to address directly the implications of the 
Coextensionality Thesis for normative ethical theories, namely, virtue ethics, 
consequentialism, and deontology, so as to suggest how one might begin to fill out 
the account offered in Chapter 2, depending upon the normative framework that 
one accepts.  I will do so by, first, considering the implications of the thesis for 
virtue ethics.  Then, in Section 2, I will note the ways in which various forms of 
consequentialism might make use of the metaethical thesis, and, as a part of that 
discussion, argue that rule-consequentialism and consequentialist theories on which 
acts are weighed as part of states of affairs cannot be held if the thesis is true.  In 
Section 3, I will argue that, as in the case of consequentialist theories, if the 
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Coextensionality Thesis is true, then certain sorts of deontological theories cannot 
be consistently maintained, although others, it seems, can.  Finally, in Section 4, I 
will briefly argue that it may be fruitful to think of normative ethical theories as 
fundamentally divided between consequentialist theories and virtue ethics, and to 
think of deontology as a variant of virtue ethics.  
§1: Being, Good, and Virtue Ethics 
 ‘Virtue ethics’ is a normative ethical approach on which moral character is of 
predominate concern, rather than duties or the consequences of actions.  It is also 
characteristic of virtue ethicists to argue that an action is morally good, absolutely 
speaking, if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. 
acting in character) do in the circumstances and it is done as the virtuous agent 
would characteristically do it (i.e. with the appropriate motives, reasons, etc.).81 In 
light of Chapter 2, it may already be clear that such an approach resonates with the 
Coextensionality Thesis.  In the following two sub-sections, I will note the ways in 
which the Coextensionality Thesis supports the notion that it is appropriate to 
evaluate moral agents and actions in a way that is consistent with naturalistic 
versions of virtue ethics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  This	  definition	  of	  morally	  good	  action	  is	  closer	  to	  Aristotle	  than	  Hursthouse,	  but	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  both,	  as	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  the	  following:	  Hursthouse’s	  definition	  of	  right	  action	  states,	  “an	  action	  is	  right	  iff	  it	  is	  what	  a	  virtuous	  agent	  would	  characteristically	  (i.e.	  acting	  in	  character)	  do	  in	  the	  circumstances.”	  	  Whereas	  Aristotle	  says,	  “…what	  is	  true	  of	  crafts	  is	  not	  true	  of	  virtues.	  	  For	  the	  products	  of	  a	  craft	  determine	  by	  their	  own	  qualities	  whether	  they	  have	  been	  produced	  well;	  and	  so	  it	  suffices	  that	  they	  have	  the	  right	  qualities	  when	  they	  have	  been	  produced.	  	  But	  for	  actions	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  virtues	  to	  be	  done	  temperately	  or	  justly	  it	  does	  not	  suffice	  that	  they	  themselves	  have	  the	  right	  qualities.	  	  Rather,	  the	  agent	  must	  also	  be	  in	  the	  right	  state	  when	  he	  does	  them”	  (Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  1105a27-­‐32).	  Rosalind	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  28.	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§1.1: The Virtuous Agent 
 How are we to evaluate the goodness of human beings?  I suggested an 
answer to this question in the previous chapter, an answer connected to the perfect-
thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis.  And the answer that I suggested 
is the very same as that generally given by naturalistic virtue ethicists.  It begins 
with the claim that a human being is good insofar as she is a perfect member of her 
kind. A human being is considered a perfect member of her kind insofar as she has 
the attributes that characteristically allow human beings to achieve the human 
final end(s).  These attributes are called ‘virtues’ and the end(s) ‘eudaimonia.’  So, a 
human being is good insofar as she has the virtues that characteristically allow 
human beings to attain eudaimonia. 
 I took the discussion no further than this in the previous chapter and it is not 
my intention here to offer a substantive account of the human end(s), or to develop 
an elaborate theory of the virtues.  I refrain from doing so both because many far 
abler than I have undertaken that sort of project and because such a project would 
take us too far afield.82  However, for the purpose of clarity, I will briefly lay out one 
possible substantive account and note the way in which it may connect to the 
perfect-thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis. 
 Any such account will begin with a characterization of the human final end, 
rather than an account of the virtues (or non-essential concrete attributes that 
characteristically allow a thing to attain its end(s)).  The reason for this should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  See,	  for	  example,	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre,	  Dependent	  Rational	  Animals:	  Why	  Human	  Beings	  need	  the	  Virtues,	  (Chicago:	  Open	  Court,	  2001)	  and	  Foot,	  Natural	  Goodness.	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clear from what has been said in the previous chapter: the virtues are designated 
‘virtues’ because they characteristically are required if a thing is to achieve its end.  
So what makes a thing a ‘virtue’ is its relation to the final end.  Because I take it to 
be a useful example to consider, as it is relatively easy to work through its 
implications, let us say that the human final end is perfect union with the Judeo-
Christian God. This union is taken to be analogous to the case of a human 
relationship in which there is perfect intimacy characterized by knowledge and deep 
love.  
 After identifying a fixed final end, any virtue ethical account will then specify 
the non-essential concrete attributes (or ‘virtues’) that characteristically allow 
human beings to attain that final end.  So, again, the character of the final end 
dictates the set of virtues that are required in order to attain it.  If the final end is 
perfect union with the Judeo-Christian God, then the requisite attributes include 
moral virtues, such as temperance and fortitude, as well as so-called theological 
virtues, such as faith and charity (or love).  These traits are considered virtues 
because, given the cluster of beliefs surrounding the Judeo-Christian God, perfect 
union with God requires them.   
 It is important to note just how deeply connected these virtues are to the final 
end, for any compelling proposal in virtue ethics will explain why a given set of 
virtues should be considered genuine virtues (or non-essential concrete attributes 
that characteristically allow one to attain the human end).  If God is morally perfect 
and due to this perfection cannot be experienced by the immoral without great 
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anguish, then, of course, if one is to be united to God, one must be perfectly moral 
(and moral in the way that God specifies).   Also, if this union is partially 
characterized by a kind of knowledge, then one must have the virtue that is 
required for ‘knowing,’ at least in some sense, that which is above natural reason.  
That virtue is generally called ‘faith.’  And, finally, if the union is characterized by 
deep love, then one must have the virtue of charity, if one is to enter into loving 
relationship with God.83 
 Now, having briefly considered the general form of the account, let us turn for 
a moment to the metaphysical view that is just below the surface, namely, the view 
developed in connection with the Coextensionality Thesis.  Relative to the case of 
human beings, the perfect-thing formulation of the Coextensionality Thesis states 
that a human being is good to the extent to which she is a perfect member of her 
kind.  And, given the hypothesis that the human end is union with God, she would 
be a perfect member of her kind to the extent to which she had the virtues (or non-
essential concrete attributes) appropriate to achieving that end.  So, if she had all of 
the appropriate moral and theological virtues, she would be considered completely 
good because she would have both the full amount of substantial goodness and 
accidental goodness possible. If she had none of the virtues, she would be considered 
good in a certain respect (namely, good with respect to substantial goodness), but 
entirely bad with respect to accidental goodness, which is the primary sort of 	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  Aquinas	  calls	  the	  virtues	  of	  faith,	  hope,	  and	  charity,	  “theological	  virtues”	  and	  “infused	  virtues.”	  	  They	  are	  “theological”	  because	  they	  direct	  us	  towards	  God	  as	  our	  final	  end.	  	  They	  are	  “infused”	  because	  they	  are,	  ultimately,	  God’s	  gift	  to	  us	  and	  they	  are	  thus	  infused	  into	  us	  by	  God.	  	  For	  a	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  taxonomy	  of	  virtues	  that	  Aquinas	  accepts,	  see	  Rebecca	  Konyndyk	  DeYoung,	  et.	  al.,	  Aquinas’s	  Ethics:	  Metaphysical	  
Foundations,	  Moral	  Theory,	  and	  Theological	  Context,	  (Notre	  Dame:	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  2009),	  129-­‐151.	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goodness in creatures, because she lacks the non-essential concrete attributes 
appropriate to attaining the human end.  If she had some of the virtues, she would 
be good to a lesser extent than the first of these and to a greater extent than the 
second.  For she would have both substantial goodness and a share in accidental 
goodness and thus she would be closer to having the attributes characteristically 
required to attain union with God. So virtues are considered good-making in a 
primary sort of way because of their close connection to the final end; that is, 
because they characteristically are required if one is to attain the final end.  
Essential concrete attributes of things are considered good-making in a very 
secondary sort of way and, indeed, they are considered more or less irrelevant to an 
assessment of a thing’s genuine goodness, all things considered.  This is so because 
the essential attributes of a thing, those attributes that one has just in virtue of 
being a member of one’s kind, do little more than establish a thing’s end and 
provide a set of capacities, whereas the appropriate set of non-essential attributes of 
a thing characteristically allow a thing to attain its end.  And the goodness of a 
thing is related to end attainment, rather than end establishment. 
 Of course, I could fairly easily outline an entirely different sort of theory than 
the theological one I have just described. All that one need do is designate a 
different sort of human final end.  For example, we could designate happiness 
(understood as the experience of pleasure and the absence of pain) as the final end 
and derive a set of virtues characteristically required to achieve this sort of 
happiness.  However, I hope that the way in which the Coextensionality Thesis 
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relates to an account of the goodness of an agent from the standpoint of virtue 
ethics is sufficiently clear from the example I have given.  So let us turn to the case 
of virtuous action. 
§1.2: Virtuous Action 
 An ethical theory naturally seems incomplete if it includes only a theory of 
the goodness of agents.  A theory of the goodness of actions is clearly also required.  
In this section, I will consider the account of good actions often given by virtue 
ethicists, namely, that an action is morally good (absolutely speaking) if and only if 
it is done by a fully virtuous agent.  I will argue that such an account of good actions 
is supported by the Coextensionality Thesis because the thesis suggests that 
whatever morally good actions are, they must be morally good in a derivative sense.  
In the case of virtue ethics, the moral goodness of actions is believed to derive from 
what virtue ethicists consider to be the primary case of moral goodness, namely, the 
moral goodness of agents.  
 So let us now turn to the case of good human actions.  It is important to note 
that here I am concerned with good actions, rather than right actions.  By ‘right 
action,’ I mean an action that one is obliged to perform because it is in accord with a 
moral principle.84  If the Coextensionality Thesis is true, then what it is to be a 
‘good action’ is not immediately clear. So let us investigate the matter further. 
 According to the Coextensionality Thesis, the primary bearers of goodness 
are substances.  That is, whether the goodness in question is functional or moral, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Charles	  Lamore,	  “Right	  and	  good,”	  in	  E.	  Craig	  (ed.),	  Routledge	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998),	  retrieved	  March	  25,	  2011,	  from	  http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L087SECT2.	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the primary good things are substances (e.g. a man, a horse, a cactus).  And 
substances are considered good to whatever extent in virtue of having the set of 
attributes that are characteristically required to attain their ends.  Now, if 
substances are the primary bears of good and they are good in virtue of attributes, 
where does that leave the notion of a ‘good action’? 
 It seems that actions, considered in themselves, cannot be good, if the 
Coextensionality Thesis is true.  For actions are clearly not substances and so they 
are not among the primary bears of goodness.  (Of course, an action may be 
precisely the sort of thing that bears rightness and, indeed, it seems correct to say 
that actions are the primary bearers of rightness.)  It also seems clear that actions 
may bear goodness in a secondary, or derivative, sort of way.  For we certainly 
believe that some actions are good, even if they are not good in a non-derivative 
sense.  Thus it seems to follow from the Coextensionality Thesis that good actions – 
whatever they are – are not good when considered simply as actions, but good in 
some derivative sense.  For, again, an action is not the sort of thing that is good, 
considered in itself; an action is not a substance.  But this, again, does not exclude 
the possibility that actions are good in a secondary sense, nor the possibility that 
actions are right or wrong in themselves. 
 No doubt, this conclusion will seem to some to prove that the 
Coextensionality Thesis and the view that I have built up around it are false.  For 
an action seems to be the sort of thing that can be good or bad considered in itself. 
For instance, saving a drowning child seems to be a good action considered in itself.  
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So, if this action cannot be considered good in itself by the lights of this thesis, then 
the thesis must be false. 
 Here it is important to note that there is a threefold distinction to be made 
between (1) an action considered in itself, (2) an action considered in relation to the 
character of an actor, and (3) an action considered in relation to its consequences.  
An action considered in itself is an action considered conceptually apart from the 
character of an actor and apart from its consequences.  It does not seem particularly 
strange to think that all actions considered in this way do not bear the quality of 
being good or bad. This is obvious to consequentialists, for on a consequentialist 
view, actions are good or bad only in relation to their consequences.  And, indeed, 
even in the objection, that in virtue of which the action is a good action seems to be 
the consequence of the action – namely, the saving of the child.  One might change 
the objection and say that it is obviously a good action, in itself, even if (or perhaps 
especially if) the person attempts to save the child and both the ‘hero’ and child 
drown in the attempt.  But then, it seems that the reason the action is considered 
good has to do with our assessment of the character of the actor, not the action 
considered in itself. (This sort of view on which an action is considered good because 
of a set of facts about the actor is precisely the sort of view that virtue ethicists 
defend.) Thus it seems that the view of good actions entailed by the 
Coextensionality Thesis is at least prima facie plausible because a good action 
seems to be good in a derivative sense; good either because of a relation it bears to 
the character of an actor, or because of the relation it bears to a set of consequences, 
	   85	  
or perhaps both.  
 But before concluding that actions must be derivatively good either because 
of some relation that holds between actions and actors or between actions and 
consequences, we must consider a third possibility.  Perhaps actions derive their 
goodness from some relation to a set of rules or principles that outline one’s duties.  
What sort of relation could that be?  It seems that there are two somewhat plausible 
options.  First, one could argue that a good action is an action that is required by a 
set of moral principles and it derives its goodness from being so required.  Second, 
one could argue that a good action is an action that is consistent with the set of 
moral principles.  That is, an action is good if and only if the set of moral principles 
doesn’t forbid the action.  I will consider both of these options in turn. 
 If one argues that a good action is an action that is required by a set of moral 
principles and a good action derives its goodness from being so required, then in 
effect one is arguing that a good action just is a right action.  For, as I noted above, 
a right action is an action that one is morally required to perform because it is in 
accord with a moral principle. But it doesn’t seem right to say that a good action is 
precisely the same thing as a right action because, at the very least, there are some 
cases in which we would say that an action is good even though one isn’t morally 
required to perform it (i.e. even though it isn’t ‘right’ in the relevant sense).  For 
example, if I jump on a grenade in a foxhole in order to save the lives of my 
compatriots, it seems obvious that I have performed a good action, but few would 
say that I was morally required to jump on the grenade.85  So the action isn’t a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  A	  maximizing	  utilitarian	  might	  say	  that	  the	  action	  is	  right	  in	  this	  sense,	  but	  because	  a	  utilitarian	  would	  also	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‘right action’ in the relevant sense and, thus, it seems that an action isn’t good just 
in case it is right. 
 But it seems that there is an obvious way to revise the theory.  Instead of 
saying that an action is a good action if it required by the moral principles (which 
leads to this absurdity related to ‘good action’ and ‘right action’ being synonymous), 
say that an action is good if and only if the relevant set of moral principles doesn’t 
forbid the action.  This is, of course, the second proposal that I suggested above.  
This proposal does avoid the absurdity noted above.  For, given this understanding 
of a good action, we can say that I acted well by jumping on the grenade because 
doing so was consistent with the relevant set of moral principles and by being 
consistent with those principles the action took on the character of goodness.  
Because all right actions are consistent with the set of moral principles, this 
proposal also allows us to conclude that all right actions are good actions, which 
seems to be an excellent result.  There is, however, a serious problem with this 
proposal as well.  If what it is to be a good action is for that action to be consistent 
with a set of moral principles, then we will be forced to conclude that many strange 
sorts of actions are good. For example, picking my nose is presumably consistent 
with this set of moral principles, as are turning on a light, sneezing, itching a 
scratch, and yawning.  All of these actions are good actions, if this proposal is true 
because they are all presumably consistent with the relevant set of moral principles.  
But that seems absurd.  So this proposal should also be rejected. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  say	  that	  the	  reason	  the	  action	  is	  right	  and	  good	  is	  because	  of	  certain	  facts	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  action.	  	  Thus,	  the	  maximizing	  utilitarian	  poses	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  goodness	  is	  related	  either	  to	  the	  character	  of	  the	  actor	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  consequences.	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 But perhaps there is one final revision that can be made.  Maybe actions 
aren’t good at all.  Maybe actions are only ever right or wrong and never good or 
bad.   
 A view of this kind would be consistent with the Coextensionality Thesis, but 
there seems to be at least one major flaw with such a view. Namely, we think that 
some actions are good.  For example, it is good to care for widows and orphans and 
it is good to save drowning children in ponds.  An adherent of the sort of view that I 
just described will have to say that, although these may be right actions, they are 
not good actions.  But this, again, seems absurd.  It clearly seems that there are 
some actions that are good and others that are bad.  And if some actions are good 
and, as this sort of objector has assumed, these good actions are not good in 
themselves, then they must be good in some derivative sense.  Having dispensed 
with the notion that they may be good because of some relation they bear to a set of 
rules, there seem to be only two options left.  Namely the two with which we began: 
(a) an action is good because it is performed by a good agent, or (b) an action is good 
because of the good consequences that result. 
 Having argued that the moral goodness of actions cannot be a feature of 
actions considered in themselves (even if the actions conform to a set of moral 
principles), moving forward, I will take it for granted that there are only two 
relations that may be relevant to an assessment of the moral character of actions: 
(1) the character of the actor, or (2) the nature of the consequences.  
 In light of this discussion, it seems that we now have a possible justification 
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for the belief common among virtue ethicists that an action is morally good, 
absolutely speaking, if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances and it is done as 
the virtuous agent would characteristically do it (i.e. with the appropriate motives, 
reasons, etc.).  If virtue ethicists have been assuming something like the 
Coextensionality Thesis that I defended in Chapter 1, then, as I argued a moment 
ago, it seems that actions cannot be considered morally good or morally bad when 
considered in themselves (if virtue ethicists don’t hold something like the 
Coextensionality Thesis, then this implication of the view may lead them to 
consider it).  Thus, actions must take their moral character from something else.  As 
I noted above, one obvious possibility is that they take their moral character from 
their source, namely, the human actor. And, indeed, if one is a virtue ethicist, it is 
quite natural to suppose that a human action does in fact take on a certain moral 
character in virtue of its relationship to the character of the actor who produced it 
because the moral goodness of agents is the primary case of moral goodness.  So 
given the Coextensionality Thesis, it is natural to think that an action is morally 
good, absolutely speaking, if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances and it is done as 
the virtuous agent would characteristically do it (i.e. with the appropriate motives, 
reasons, etc.).  
 But this will seem entirely unsatisfying to some.  They may object to this 
view as follows: The view under consideration is not action-guiding.  If one believes 
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that the goodness of action is tied entirely to the goodness of the agent, then no 
practical sort of advice can be given to those who have less than perfect characters 
to help them act morally.  This is an unacceptable result because among morality’s 
chief concerns is guiding the actions of moral agents.  Any ethical account that 
cannot guide moral agents as they seek to live moral lives should be rejected.  
Therefore, virtue ethics should be rejected as a normative ethical approach. 
 Although it is true that according to this view one cannot act morally well 
without having the appropriate virtues, it does not follow from this that no advice or 
practical guidance can be given about what we ought to do and about what kind of 
people we ought to be.  The ways in which the view may guide our decision 
procedure take at least two forms, both of which have been suggested by authors 
very much concerned with virtue ethics: (1) virtue terms, such as ‘just,’ have action-
guiding content associated with them as do vice terms, such as ‘greedy,’ and so an 
understanding of virtue and vice terms is the beginning of approximating virtuous 
behavior,86 and (2) general principles of practical reasoning may be used by the 
virtuous actor as she decides what to do and these principles may be explained to 
the non-virtuous to help them approximate the actions of the virtuous.87  And, of 
course, advice can be given about the kind of people that we ought to be.  The advice 
can take a didactic form – e.g. enumerating and explaining the virtues of character 
– or it can take an experiential form – e.g. hearing stories of, observing, or 
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  See	  Rosalind	  Hursthouse,“After	  Hume's	  Justice”,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society,	  91,	  1991:	  229–45,	  and	  see	  Hurthouse’s	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  particularly	  Chapter	  1.	  87	  John	  Finnis,	  Aquinas:	  Moral,	  Political,	  and	  Legal	  Theory,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  particularly	  79-­‐89,	  and	  103-­‐131.	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accompanying the virtuous. 
 Having briefly described the ways in Coextensionality Thesis may support at 
least moral-realist, naturalistic, virtue ethics, it should be clear that the thesis 
might be attractive to adherents of such a view.  And, unsurprisingly, well-known 
virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot already employ something quite similar to 
this thesis. 
§2: Being, Good, and Consequentialism 
 Although the Coextensionality Thesis rather obviously supports certain forms 
of virtue ethics, it is far less clear whether or not it supports, or even allows for, any 
consequentialist ethical theories.  Consequentialist theories can be thought of as 
two part theories, as Samuel Scheffler suggests.  As Scheffler says, first, a 
consequentialist theory “gives some principle for ranking overall states of affairs 
from best to worst from an impersonal standpoint,” and, second, such a theory “says 
that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the highest-
ranked state of affairs that the agent is in a position to produce.”88  In the following 
sub-sections, I will argue that the Coextensionality Thesis can provide conceptual 
support for both of these parts of consequentialist theories.   
§2.1: The nature of the consequences to be weighed 
 Consequentialist theories begin by giving a principle for ranking states of 
affairs.  Perhaps the best known such principle is the one employed by utilitarians: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Samuel	  Scheffler,	  “Introduction,”	  Consequentialism	  and	  its	  Critics,”	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  1.	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“the best state of affairs from among any set is the one that contains the greatest 
net balance of aggregate human pleasure...”89 If the Coextensionality Thesis is true, 
then it seems to place certain constraints on the nature of the consequences to be 
weighed as we consider states of affairs.  But it seems that these constraints are 
amenable to most popular versions of consequentialism. 
 What is the nature of these constraints?  Simply put, if the Thesis is correct, 
then all claims concerning goodness are grounded in substances.  More particularly, 
if the thesis is correct, a thing is good insofar as it has the perfections appropriate to 
attaining its end(s).  And so, if states of affairs are conceived of as aggregations of 
the realized good of individuals, states of affairs must be good to the extent to which 
the things in them have the perfections appropriate to them. Of course, this is 
precisely the sort of story that consequentialists often want to tell.  Let us take 
Utilitarianism as an example.  Many utilitarians wants to say that the end of 
human beings (and perhaps other animals) is a kind of happiness and that 
‘happiness’ is to be understood as the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain.90  
So, for the utilitarian, the experience of pleasure is the sole (non-instrumental) 
perfection and thus states of affairs are to be weighed as a function of the presence 
of this perfection and the absence of its opposite, pain. 
 Before considering a possible objection to the notion that this metaethical 
thesis in fact supports consequentialism, let us consider a more sophisticated form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Scheffler,	  2.	  90	  See	  for	  example,	  J.S.	  Mill’s	  Utilitarianism,	  “The	  creed	  which	  accepts	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  morals,	  Utility,	  or	  the	  Greatest	  Happiness	  Principle,	  hold	  that	  actions	  are	  right	  in	  proportion	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  promote	  happiness,	  wrong	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  produce	  the	  reverse	  of	  happiness.	  	  By	  happiness	  in	  intended	  pleasure,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  pain;	  by	  unhappiness,	  pain,	  and	  the	  privation	  of	  pleasure.”	  J.S.	  Mill,	  Henry	  West	  (ed.),	  The	  Blackwell	  Guide	  to	  
Mill’s	  Utilitarianism,	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2006),	  68.	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of consequentialism in order to demonstrate that the thesis is compatible with 
consequentialist views other than utilitarianism.  Consider the case of a 
consequentialist who is a value pluralist and so believes human happiness to be 
intimately related to the presence of a collection of perfections that includes 
knowledge, pleasure, health, etc. For this sophisticated consequentialist, there is a 
collection of relevant (non-instrumental) perfections characteristically required to 
attain the human end(s) and thus states of affairs are to be weighed as a function of 
the presence of these perfections, at least insofar as states of affairs are to be 
weighed according to the presence of human goods. 
 The final clause in the last paragraph brings to light an objection that might 
be raised against the notion that the Coextensionality Thesis is compatible with 
consequentialist theories.  For the thesis seems to force us to consider the good of all 
sorts of strange things as we weigh of states of affairs – things like plants, animals, 
and rocks as well as humans.  But weighing states of affairs with such things in 
mind (particularly plants and rocks) is absurd, or at least not what the 
consequentialist wants to say. 
 It does seem to follow from the Coextensionality Thesis that, because a thing 
is good insofar as it has the perfections appropriate to attaining its end(s), states of 
affairs must be good to the extent to which the things in them – of whatever kind – 
have the perfections appropriate to them.  But this conclusion does not seem 
absurd, nor does it seem to undermine the plausibility of consequentialist theories.  
In fact, in a way, it makes consequentialism more plausible by providing such 
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theories a less anthropocentric standard against which to judge states of affairs.  Of 
course, just because you include trees as you weigh states of affairs does not mean 
that it is appropriate to weigh their goodness heavily.  Indeed, it seems entirely 
appropriate to weigh goods as an increasing function of the capacities of things, in 
which case human goods are of the highest value, followed by animals, plants, et 
cetera.  A full theory would, of course, have some story to tell about how the goods of 
various sorts of things compare to one another, but such a full theory is not 
necessary to demonstrate that the metaethical thesis is at least consistent with 
broadly consequentialist views.  In sum, although the Coextensionality Thesis may 
force consequentialists to recognize that to at least some extent the good of non-
human entities must be considered in calculations of states of affairs, the character 
of the evaluation of human goods need not change, nor need the decision procedure 
change so long as the good(s) of humans and/or all conscious beings are considered 
to be significantly greater than the goods of other sorts of entities.91 
 Before considering the metaethical thesis in relation to good action, it is 
important to note that there is at least one sort of consequentialism with which the 
Thesis seems to be incompatible because of the nature of the consequences that it 
deems weighable – namely, the sort in which actions are to be weighed as a part of 
a state of affairs. Amartya Sen defends an account of the first sort in “Rights and 
Agency.”  Sen calls this sort of view a “Goal Rights System.” On such a view the 
“fulfillment and non-realization of rights are included among the goals, [and] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Here	  again	  it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  one	  may	  reject	  the	  idea	  that	  inanimate	  things	  of	  any	  kind	  are	  good	  in	  the	  sense	  relevant	  to	  the	  Thesis.	  	  This	  would,	  of	  course,	  mean	  rejecting	  certain	  elements	  of	  the	  Thesis	  as	  I	  have	  defended	  them,	  but	  it	  certainly	  remains	  a	  possibility.	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incorporated in the evaluation of states of affairs.”92 
 A view of this kind is at least prima facie incompatible with the 
Coextensionality Thesis because to make such a view plausible the violations of 
rights must be bad considered in themselves in order to affect our evaluation of a 
given state of affairs.  That is, violating rights must be bad in and of itself and not 
because of the consequences which follow from such violations.  However, if the 
thesis is true, then actions considered in themselves – even rights violations – are 
neither good nor bad because they are not substances and so they are not among the 
primary bearers of goodness.  For an action to be considered bad, it must take its 
character from something else. As noted above, the most promising candidates seem 
to be from the agent or from the consequences of the action. Sen obviously cannot 
avail himself of the notion that rights violations take on their character in virtue of 
the consequences of rights violations because then he would be forced to conclude 
that rights violations are not bad so long as they lead to good consequences, which 
is precisely the sort of thing that he doesn’t want to say.  Perhaps he could argue 
that rights violations take on the character of moral badness in virtue of their 
relationship to the character of the agent, but then he would need to embrace a 
fairly robust virtue theory.  So it seems that, if the metaethical thesis is true, then 
consequentialist theories on which actions considered in themselves are the sort of 
thing that are to be weighed during the evaluation of states of affairs must be 
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considered false, unless they are seriously revised to incorporate virtue in a quite 
substantive way.93 
§2.2: Good actions 
 Most versions of consequentialism are concerned with ‘rightness’ in action 
rather than ‘goodness,’ although there are notable exceptions (e.g. Alasdair 
Norcross’s ‘Scalar Utilitarianism’94).  However, even those consequentialists who 
hold ‘rightness’ in pride of place in their theories will surely grant that goodness 
and badness in action are a matter of degree.  For example, all else being equal, if 
two children are drowning and you are capable of saving both, it is best (i.e. the 
most good is done) to save both, worst to save none (i.e. the least good is done), and 
in between the two other scenarios to save one (i.e. more good is done than in saving 
none, but less good is done than in saving both).  Given this rather obvious 
implication of consequentialism, it seems that we can develop a theory of goodness 
in action even for theories that prize rightness above goodness. 
 What would such a theory look like?  Well, presumably a consequentialist 
would deny two things.  First, she would deny that an act can only be good if the 
actor is good.  So, even if someone saved the two drowning children only to collect 
reward money, that would not affect our appraisal of the act itself, although – 
obviously – it would affect our assessment of the ‘hero.’  Second, she would deny 
that an act can be good or bad considered in itself.  So, although the act of saving 	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two children from drowning may seem to be the kind of act that we can describe as 
absolutely good, the act may in fact be bad, if, e.g., one of the children were Hitler 
and the other Stalin.  Now, the consequentialist need not deny that certain acts 
tend to produce certain good outcomes and that their tendency to do so gives us 
reason to do them even if on occasion we may inadvertently do what is wrong 
objectively speaking.  The consequentialist need only deny that any particular act, 
considered in itself, is either good or bad. 
 In light of this brief description, it should be clear that the consequentialist 
theory of goodness in action is well-supported by the Coextensionality Thesis.  For 
the consequentialist rejects the notion that acts are good or bad, morally speaking, 
in themselves, which is a conclusion that follows from the Thesis.  The 
consequentialist, then, is in agreement with the virtue ethicist about at least one 
thing – acts are not the kind of thing that can be morally good or morally bad when 
considered in themselves.  Acts take on their moral character due to a relation that 
holds either between the act and the agent (in the case of virtue ethics) or between 
the act and its consequences (in the case of consequentialism).   
 So it seems clear that a consequentialist may be attracted to the 
Coextensionality Thesis as it provides a metaphysical basis both for their views 
concerning what ought to be weighed in states of affairs and their views concerning 
from whence an action takes its moral character.  However, before considering 
deontological theories, it is important to note that one other sort of consequentialist 
theory seems to be inconsistent with the metaethical thesis in question because of 
	   97	  
its account of good actions, namely, rule-consequentialist theories.  I have chosen to 
treat it here, rather than in the section on deontological theories, even though it is a 
matter of dispute as to whether it is, properly-speaking, a consequentialist or 
deontological theory because the theory so clearly relies upon elements of 
consequentialism. 
 Rule-consequentialism is the view on which “rules are to be selected on the 
basis of their aggregate net benefits; actions are to be evaluated by the rules thus 
selected.”95  In other words, possible rules are judged by and selected on the basis of 
consequentialist considerations.  That is, they are selected on the basis of their 
tendency to increase, e.g., utility.  But actions are judged without reference to their 
consequences.  So, the rule, “Do not kill an innocent person” is justified on the basis 
of the fact that following such a rule will, in general, lead to greater utility.  But, 
even in a case in which utility would be maximized by the killing of an innocent 
person, it would be wrong to do so on the rule-consequentialist account. 
 A view of this kind seems to be inconsistent with the Coextensionality Thesis 
because, after the rules are laid down, actions in themselves are considered good or 
bad without reference to the actor or to the consequences of the action.  But, as we 
know, the Thesis entails that actions considered in themselves are neither morally 
good nor bad and that the moral character of actions must be drawn from some 
other source than the actions considered in themselves.  It is tempting to think that, 
on the rule-consequentialist view, actions draw their moral character from 	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consequences because the rules were agreed upon because of their tendency to lead 
to good consequences.  But such a view is manifestly incorrect.  For once the rules 
are set, the consequences of rule-following are irrelevant to appraisals of actions.  If 
the consequences of following a rule were taken into account as one appraises a 
rule-following action, then the view would no longer be rule-consequentialism.  It 
would be act-consequentialism.  And although act-consequentialism is consistent 
with the metaethical thesis, surely a rule-consequentialist doesn’t want to be forced 
to become an act-consequentialist. 
 A rule-consequentialist might object by arguing that I have misconstrued 
rule-consequentialism.  An action is not good in itself because a rule says that one 
ought to do it, this objector might say.  An action is only right in itself if it is in 
accord with the set of rules.  And, if that is so, then we may still evaluate the 
goodness of an action in light of its consequences, even if the rightness of an action 
is unassociated with its consequences.  This provides a way out of the conclusion 
suggested above, namely, that rule-consequentialism is incompatible with the 
metaethical thesis under consideration. 
 I agree that one might escape the inconsistency by divorcing the right and the 
good in action.  Certainly one might say that actions considered in themselves are 
right or wrong, but actions considered in themselves are not good or bad; they are 
only good or bad when considered in relation to their consequences.  But, if one does 
so, it seems that rule-consequentialism will almost certainly collapse into act-
consequentialism.  For, on a rule-consequentialist view the right is a creation meant 
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to serve the good.  The right is not independently motivating.  Its motivational force 
is entirely derived from its relation to the good.  So, because the motivational force 
of the right is derived from the motivational force of the good, it seems that an 
assessment of the rightness or wrongness of an action should not motivate one 
apart from considerations concerning the good because whatever motivational force 
the right has it has in virtue of the relation it bears to the good.  But, if one’s 
assessment of the good to be produced by an action is the ultimate motivation for 
acting in a particular way, then one is no longer a rule-consequentialist.  One has 
become an act-consequentialist. 
§3: Being, Good, and Deontological Theories 
 As in the case of consequentialism, it is not particularly clear whether 
deontological theories are generally compatible with the Coextensionality Thesis.  
In this section, I will, first, argue that contractarian deontological theories and 
patient-centered deontological theories as they are generally understood cannot be 
maintained if this Thesis is true.  Then I will briefly describe the sorts of 
deontological theories that might be consistent with the Thesis and argue that such 
theories are best understood as a sub-species of virtue ethics. 
§3.1: The sorts of deontological theories that must be rejected 
 Generally speaking, if the Thesis under consideration is true, then any 
deontological theory on which actions considered in themselves are thought to have 
the character of moral goodness or moral badness must be rejected.  This is so 
because, as I argued above, actions considered in themselves do not bear moral 
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goodness or badness because they are not substances and, if the Coextensionality 
Thesis is true, substances alone are the primary bearers of goodness.  Thus an 
action must take its moral character from something external to the action itself.  
So any deontological theory that holds that actions are morally good or morally bad 
when considered in themselves must be rejected.  But does anyone hold such a 
view? 
 It seems that at least two sorts of deontological theories may hold a view 
similar to the one that I have described: (1) contractarian deontological theories and 
(2) patient-centered deontological theories.  I will describe versions of both of these 
sorts of theories that seem to be incompatible with the Coextensionality Thesis, but 
I leave open the possibility that, with revision, theories of these general sorts may 
be made consistent with the Thesis.  Let us consider both of these theories in turn.  
§3.1.1: Contractarian deontological theories 
 Because of the influence of John Rawls, contractarianism is better known as 
a political theory than a moral theory. But contractarianism has been defended as a 
moral theory, most notably by David Gauthier in his Morals by Agreement.96  In 
general, a contractarian deontological theory “claims that moral norms derive their 
normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement.”97  In Morals by 
Agreement, Gauthier asks us to imagine a group of entirely self-interested 
individuals seeking to maximize their own utility.  He thinks that each individual 
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in such a group would agree to certain moral norms because doing so would 
minimize the concessions that one must make relative to the concessions made by 
other parties to the bargain.  In effect, agreeing to a set of moral norms minimizes 
the dangers that one faces vis-à-vis one’s compatriots and increases the benefits of 
social cooperation.   
 Why believe that a contractarian theory of this sort is incompatible with the 
Coextensionality Thesis?  Simply put, because once the moral norms are set, actions 
considered in themselves are considered the bearers of certain moral characteristics 
apart from considerations about their sources or their consequences.  So once it is 
agreed that, “Cheating others is wrong (or bad),” an action considered in itself bears 
the moral character of badness.  It bears this character without reference to the 
actor who might cheat others and without reference to the consequences that might 
follow from cheating another in a particular case.  Thus it seems that a 
contractarian view of this kind is incompatible with the metaethical thesis under 
consideration. 
 Of course, a contractarian might reply to this sort of argument by noting that 
it is not his intention to provide an account of moral properties or moral 
characteristics on which they are genuine properties of persons, actions, etc.  
Rather, he might maintain that they are conventional properties or characteristics 
– properties or characteristics that are entirely dependent upon an agreement.  Of 
course, such an option is open, but it amounts to little more than a denial of the 
metaethical thesis under consideration and so, because we are assuming that the 
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thesis is true for the purposes of this chapter, I will not consider this response any 
further. 
§3.1.2: Patient-centered deontological theories 
 Patient-centered deontological theories are those on which people’s rights are 
central to moral considerations, rather than people’s duties.  At the core of most 
such theories is “the right against being used only as means for producing good 
consequences without one's consent.”98  Robert Nozick, Eric Mack, Peter Vallentyne, 
and Hillel Steiner, among others, defend theories of this general kind.99 
 Not all patient-centered deontological theories are, or at least need be, 
inconsistent with the Coextensionality Thesis.  Only those that claim that rights 
violations considered in themselves – without reference to the actor perpetrating 
the violation or those affected by the rights violation – are bad.  Now, of course, it 
seems that some would say that a rights violation is not bad, considered in itself.  
Rather, it is bad for some deeper reason.  The deeper reason will probably bottom 
out in considerations regarding respect for the autonomy or rationality of others.  If 
that is so, then, depending upon how one describes this deeper reason, the view may 
either be compatible or incompatible with the thesis under consideration. 
 If what makes a rights violation a bad thing is that a rights violation harms 
or in some sense injures the one whose rights have been violated, ultimately 	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because of some harm to that person’s autonomy or rationality, then the moral 
character of the action is drawn from the consequences of that action.  That is, then 
it seems that the act of violating someone’s rights isn’t bad considered in itself.  
Rather, it is bad because of some relation between the action and the action’s 
effects.  This sort of view is clearly compatible with the Thesis in question. 
 However, if the badness of violating someone’s rights is derived from the 
intrinsic badness of disrespecting the autonomy or rationality of a person, then it 
seems that such a view is incompatible with the metaethical thesis.  For if a right’s 
violation is intrinsically bad, then an action that violates a right is intrinsically bad, 
apart from considerations of the act’s effects.  And, as should be clear by now, if an 
action is considered bad (or good) in itself, then such a view is incompatible with the 
Thesis under consideration. 
§3.2: The sorts of ‘deontological’ theories that can be consistently maintained 
 In this section, I will note that a variety of ‘deontological’ theories are 
consistent with the Coextensionality Thesis.  However, after considering these 
theories, I will further note that, if the thesis is true, such theories apparently must 
ultimately evaluate actions either as virtue ethicists do or as consequentialists do.  
But, as should be clear, it seems preferable from the perspective of a deontologist to 
evaluate actions as virtue ethicists do, rather than as consequentialists do. 
 In general, a deontological theory will be consistent with the Thesis if, 
according to the theory, in every case an action is considered morally good or 
morally bad because of a relation that holds between the action and either some 
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characteristic(s) of the actor or because of a relation between the action and the 
consequences of the action.  (I am, of course, assuming that a right action is 
considered a good action on the deontological view and that wrong actions are 
considered bad.  If a right action is not considered a good action according to a given 
deontological theory, then, as I noted above, such a theory need not be in conflict 
with the Coextensionality Thesis, but seems objectionable for other reasons.)  Given 
this description, it may sound as though many, if not most, deontological theories 
will not make the cut.  However, popular contemporary deontological accounts can 
seemingly be consistently maintained even if the Coextentionality Thesis is true. 
 For example, consider the broadly deontological theory advanced by Christine 
Korsgaard in her book, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.100  She 
maintains, “A good action is one that constitutes its agent as the autonomous and 
efficacious cause of her own movements. These properties correspond, respectively, 
to Kant’s two imperatives of practical reason.  Conformity to the categorical 
imperative renders us autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical imperative 
renders us efficacious.”101  It seems, then, on Korsgaard’s view that, although 
actions must have certain characteristics in order to be considered good, the 
relevant characteristics are relational in nature and not characteristics of actions 
considered in themselves.  That is, a good action must bear a particular sort of 
relation to the agent responsible for the action in order to be considered good.  If 
that is so, then it seems that one might say that the action draws its character from 	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certain features of the agent because a good action requires that the agent be 
rational in a particular sort of way in order to perform good actions, that is, in order 
to perform actions that conform to the categorical and hypothetical imperatives.  
And, if that is the case, then one might suggest that the actions draw their moral 
character from a set of facts about the agent and the agent’s process of decision-
making.  Then, it would be right to conclude that Korsgaard’s theory is consistent 
with the Thesis that we are considering. 
 Again abstracting away from any particular theory, it seems that any 
deontological theory on which the relation between the agent and the action is 
central to an assessment of the action’s moral character is consistent with the 
Thesis.  So, if a theory maintains that actions are only good if they express the 
rationality of the agent by conforming to some rational law (such as the categorical 
imperative), such a theory would be consistent with the metaethical thesis.  For 
then the moral character of the action would be drawn from the rationality of the 
agent.  Or if we agree with Kant’s dictum that “it is impossible to think of anything 
at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without 
limitation except a good will,” because the will is a faculty of an agent, we might say 
that actions are good in a derivative sense that follows from the goodness of the will 
of an agent. 102 These two approaches, as well as that of Korsgaard, have three 
features: (1) they are consistent with the Thesis; (2) they seem to be faithful 
deontological theories; and (3), at least in outline, they share the same sort of 	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account of good actions as virtue ethicists. 
 It seems that another sort of approach is consistent with the metaethical 
thesis that at least has the appearance of deontology.  As suggested above, it is 
possible to think that, e.g., rights-violations are wrong because of the harm that is 
consequent upon such violations.  Of course, if one believes that this is why rights 
violations are bad, then one believes that rights violations draw their moral 
character from the nature of their consequences.  But because of the centrality of 
rights in such theories, in order to preserve the priority of rights over considerations 
of goodness, one might say that the good protected by rights is lexically prior to 
goods of other sorts, such as pleasure; that is, one could argue that no amount of 
good of other sorts can justify rights violations.  In so doing, it seems that one can 
preserve a largely deontological theory even if the moral character of rights 
violations is taken from the nature of the consequences of such violations. 
 Of course, this sort of view seems entirely unsatisfactory because it seems to 
force one into a well-recognized problem.103  Imagine that I am captured by an evil 
dictator.  The dictator takes me to a room with six prisoners that are bound and 
gagged.  He tells me that I can either kill one of the six or he will kill five of the six.  
Let’s further say that I have every reason to believe that he is telling the truth.  
Obviously, if I kill the one person, I would violate her rights.  But if I refuse to do so, 
I am almost certain that five rights violations of precisely the same kind will occur.  
What am I to do?  If we say that I should kill the one, then it seems that this 	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deontological theory is, in many respects, just a form of consequentialism.  But if we 
say that I should refrain from killing the one and allow the dictator to kill the five, 
then there is a sort of inconsistency in the view.  For if we take the route suggested 
in the paragraph above, then rights violations aren’t bad in themselves.  They are 
only bad because of what follows from them.  So given a case like this one in which 
one rights violation would prevent five of precisely the same kind of rights violation 
it seems that we must admit that it is better to kill the one to save the five.  But, 
again, then it seems that we have embraced a consequentialist theory, one that is 
more complicated and robust than utilitarianism, admittedly, but consequentialist 
in nature nonetheless.104 
 So it seems that, although deontological theories could at least in principle be 
maintained whether they ultimately rest the moral character of actions in 
consequences or characteristics of agents, it seems that deontologists ought to prefer 
the latter option.  Indeed, as in the case of Korsgaard, it seems that some have 
already embraced something very much like it. 
§4: The Coextensionality Thesis as restructuring the normative debate 
 Before concluding the essay, I would like to briefly argue that, if the 
Coextensionality Thesis is true, it may be illuminating to recast the normative 
debate as a debate between virtue ethics and consequentialism rather than, as is 
often done, a debate between deontology and consequentialism.  This is so because 
deontology can profitably be seen as a variant of virtue ethics.  A full defense of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  See	  Scheffler,	  “Agent-­‐Centred	  Restrictions,	  Rationality,	  and	  the	  Virtues.”	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notion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I would like to briefly lay out a set of 
reasons in support of the idea that we ought to see deontology as a form of virtue 
ethics, particularly if the Coextensionality Thesis is true. 
 First, consider theories regarding good actions.  If the Coextensionality 
Thesis is true, then it seems that there are only two possible sources from which 
actions may draw the character of goodness – the character of the agent or the 
character of the consequences. So, as regards the evaluation of goodness in action, it 
seems that there are only two possible accounts – an action is good if and only if it is 
done by an agent with particular good-making characteristics, or an action is good 
to the extent to which it produces good consequences.105  These accounts are 
obviously those already accepted by virtue ethicists and consequentialists 
respectively.  Thus it seems that, if the Thesis is true, the debate, as least as it 
regards good actions, naturally divides along the line between virtue ethicists and 
consequentialists rather than along the line between deontologists and 
consequentialists.  And, indeed, it seems that some prominent deontologists, 
Christine Korsgaard foremost among them, see good actions as actions that draw a 
particular sort of character from features of the agent.  So for Korsgaard  and those 
deontologists with similar views, even if the Thesis were false, it may seem natural 
to say that an action is good if and only if it is done by an agent who is fully rational 
(in some way to be specified, perhaps with reference to the categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives). 
 Now, what would follow for deontological views concerning the goodness of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  It	  may	  also	  be	  possible	  to	  form	  some	  sort	  of	  hybrid	  account.	  
	   109	  
actors, if deontology were seen as a variant of virtue ethics?  It seems obvious that 
most deontological theories would fit quite easily into the general frame provided by 
the Coextensionality Thesis in regards to good actors.  The non-essential concrete 
attributes that are relevant to goodness would primarily be those in virtue of which 
one’s reason is perfected – virtues such as insight, understanding, et cetera.  A 
deontologist may then fill out this picture by discussing certain secondary virtues 
that allow one to act in accord with reason once reason has rendered a verdict (e.g. 
temperance and fortitude). So, generally speaking, what it is to be a good actor from 
a deontological perspective is primarily related to having the virtues related to 
being a fully rational agent and secondarily to those virtues related to being an 
agent who can act in accord with the prescriptions of reason.  As in the case of 
actions, this understanding of deontology seems quite natural, despite the fact (or 
perhaps because of the fact) that it is being considered as a form of virtue ethics. 
 There may, however, be one genuinely distinct feature that deontology would 
add to virtue ethics as I have described it: an emphasis on the relevance of certain 
essential concrete attributes to claims about goodness – namely those essential 
attributes related to being a person, or rational agent, in the relevant sense.  For it 
seems that deontologists often believe the capacity for reason to be a very important 
good-making attribute of a thing.  And this emphasis as well as the emphasis on 
reason – broadly construed – may distinguish deontology from conventional forms of 
virtue ethics in such a way that, though they are understood as two species of a 
single genus, they are rightly considered distinct normative options.  
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 Finally, if deontology is understood as a variant of virtue ethics, it seems that 
a deontologist may be in a better position to give a fairly compelling response to a 
significant objection that is frequently made to deontological theories; it is the same 
objection that I noted above.  Consider Samuel Scheffler’s statement of the problem: 
“how can it be rational to forbid the performance of a morally objectionable action 
that would have the effect of minimizing the total number of comparably 
objectionable actions that were performed and would have no other morally relevant 
consequences?  How can the minimization of morally objectionable conduct be 
morally unacceptable?”106  If we understand deontology as a variant of virtue ethics, 
then it is immediately clear how one might begin to respond to this objection.  
Scheffler is assuming that actions must be evaluated morally either in themselves 
(as a kind of action) or in relation to their consequences.  But if deontology is a form 
of virtue ethics, then there is another option available to the deontologist: an action 
is morally good or morally bad because of certain characteristics of the agent 
performing the action – e.g., the agent’s rationality.  Properly speaking, conduct is 
not morally acceptable or morally unacceptable in itself.  So it seems that faced with 
a situation in which a particular action would prevent the occurrence of many 
actions of the same kind, the ideal deontological agent (the characteristics of whom 
would, of course, be theory-dependent) has two options.  First, she could do the 
action in question and prevent the occurrence of other actions of the same kind.  If 
she did so, then her action would be morally good and not morally objectionable at 
all.  Second, she could refrain from doing the action in question and allow other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Samuel	  Scheffler,	  “Restrictions,	  Rationality,	  and	  the	  Virtues,”	  244.	  
	   111	  
actions of the kind from which she refrained to occur.  If she did so, then her action 
would be good and the moral character of the actions of others would be dependent 
upon facts about those agents.  In either case, the consequences that follow from the 
ideal deontological agent’s action are irrelevant to its moral appraisal.  The kind of 
action that it is is irrelevant as well.  The only feature relevant to the action’s moral 
appraisal is the set of characteristics of the agent.  Of course, this is not a full 
treatment of the issue, but it does seem to provide the beginnings of a new sort of 
response.  
Conclusion 
 Over the course of this chapter, I considered what would follow for normative 
ethics, if the Coextensionality Thesis were true.  I addressed the three major 
normative theories in turn – virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontological 
theories.  I argued that this Thesis may be attractive to all persuasions of realist 
virtue ethicists (particularly of the naturalistic variety) as a grounding for such 
views. Although, how precisely virtue ethicists develop their views will depend upon 
their understandings of the human final end.  I also argued that, although some 
consequentialist theories would necessarily be inconsistent with the metaethical 
thesis, it seems that some consequentialist theories can be grounded in the thesis as 
well.  I then similarly argued that any deontological theory on which acts do not 
derive their moral status from the character of the acts considered in themselves 
likewise may be grounded in the Coextensionality Thesiss.  Finally, I briefly argued 
that it may be illuminating to recast the normative debate as fundamentally 
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divided between virtue ethics and consequentialism, rather than between 
deontology and consequentialism.  I hope that it is now clearer how the 
Coextensionality Thesis, if true, might affect normative ethical theory and 
normative ethical discourse. 
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